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I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing trade among the Republic of China ("Taiwan"), the
People's Republic of China ("China"),' and China's Hong Kong Special
' Unless otherwise indicated, the Republic of China (Taiwan) refers to the government of
the Republic of China, present in Taiwan since 1949. The full area of Taiwan under the
control of the Kuomintang ("KMT") includes the islands of Taiwan, Pescadores (Penghu,
and the offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu. The People's Republic of China ("China") re-
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Administrative Region ("Hong Kong")2 has led to the formation of an in-
formal economic region, known as the Chinese Economic Area ("CEA").
3
Although the CEA does not have a written agreement such as the European
fers to the government of the People's Republic of China in control of Mainland China since
1949.
The administration of the KMT moved to Taiwan following the victory of the Chinese
Communist Party ("CCP") in the Chinese Civil War of 1949. The CCP established commu-
nist China in place of the Republic of China and took Taiwan's seat in the United Nations on
October 26, 1971. The Republic of China, however, has never renounced its claim to being
the sole legitimate government of all China, nor does it view itself as an independent coun-
try. In fact, political tensions exist between the People's Republic of China and the Republic
of China because both governments consider Taiwan to be an integral part of China. Fol-
lowing the Chinese Civil War, both the CCP and the KNIT claimed sovereignty over main-
land China. Presently, the People's Republic of China presides over the largest geographic
region of China. See Parris Chang & Kok-ui Lim, Point-Counterpoint: The International
Status of Taiwan: Taiwan's Case for United National Membership, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOR. Ar. 393, 393-397 (1996). Also, the People's Republic of China gained sovereignty
over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, and will take over Macao on December 20, 1999. See Paul
Fifoot, One Country, Two Systems - Mark I: From Hong Kong to Macao, Int'l Rel. 25
(1994).2In order to transfer the colony of Hong Kong, Britain signed the Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of China [hereinafter Basic Law] with China at the
Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong in 1984. Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong
is a Special Administrative Region of China which is to retain its own financial and political
system for at least fifty years. Therefore, in this article, Hong Kong is referred to as an inde-
pendent economic entity. See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion of the Peoples' Republic of China, April 4, 1990, China-G. Brit. 29 I.L.M. 1520
(ratified March 1990; adopted by the National People's Congress, April 1990).3Taiwan's trade and investment with China has been growing at a remarkable rate. Indi-
rect trade between Taiwan and China reached US$7.32 billion in the first six months of
1997, up nearly 5.5 percent from the same period in 1996. Taiwan's trade with China is
conducted mainly through Hong Kong and accounted for 16 percent to 17 percent of Tai-
wan's total global trade in 1998. See Trade with Mainland Grows, FREE CHINA J. Feb. 14,
1997, at 3; RANDALL JONES ET AL., THE CHINESE ECONOMIC AREA: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
WITHOUT A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 1, 5 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment Research Working Paper No. 124, 1992) (stating that the opening of China's
economy and defacto economic integration with the economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan
results in an informal economic area which may be called the Chinese Economic Area).
Other terms also refer to the Chinese Economic Area, such as "Greater China," "Chinese
Triangle," "South China Economic Community," and "Chinese Productivity Triangle."
However, all of these different terms describe the same geographic area. See Sally Stewart
et al., The South China Economic Community, 27 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., 30, 31 (1992);
Paul S. P. Hsu, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China: The Chinese Productivity Triangle, 27
INT'L LAW. 523 (1993); Jeffrey C. Y. Li, COMMENT: Strategic Negotiation in the Greater
Chinese Economic Area: A New American Perspective, 59 ALB. L. REv. 1035, 1037 n.8,
(1996), [Daoliong Zha, A "Great China"? The Political Economy of Chinese National Re-
unification, 5 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 40 (1994); Harry Harding, The Concept of "Greater
China ": Themes, Variations and Reservations, in GREATER CHINA THE NEXT SUPERPOWER?
8 (David Shambaugh ed. 1995), GREATER CHINA: LAW, SOCIETY, AND TRADE 1 (Alice E-S
Tay & Conita S. C. Leung eds., 1995); and PENELOPE HARTLAND-THuNBERG, CHINA, HONG
KONG AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 97 (1995).
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Union ("EU")4 and the North American Free Trade Agreement,5 current
economic integration in the CEA has resulted in advancement for the entire
region.6 Due to existing political tensions between Taiwan7 and China, the
trade between the two entities occurs indirectly through the private sector
via Hong Kong and other countries.
The soundness of the banking system reflects the health of the econ-
omy.8 The informal economic relations among Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
China create one of the giant regional economic areas of the world. In ad-
dition, vigorous economic growth has fostered the development of the
CEA's financial markets. Opportunities in construction, energy, high-tech
production, and exports contribute to a favorable economic climate and am-
ple business opportunities for financial service providers. 9 In theory, the
relationship between economic development and banking development is
interdependent; the successes and failures of one produce consequences for
4The European Economic Community, building on the experience of the European Coal
and Steel Community, envisioned a customs union, enhanced by the free establishment of
enterprises and a competition policy to assure the development and maintenance of a free
market economy within the economic area. As of 1995, the E.U. consists of Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, France, unified Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Turkey, Malta, Cyprus,
Hungary, and Poland have applications pending for 1995 and most Central and Eastern
European countries have applied for membership. See RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W.
GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 27.28 (1995).
5North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA], Dec. 17, 1992, reprinted
in 32 I.L.M. 289, 297 (1993) (indicating that the NAFTA attempts to reduce distortions of
trade between Canada, the United States, and Mexico).
6See Robert F. Ash and Y.Y. Kueh, Economic Integration within Greater China: Trade
and Investment Flows between China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, CHINA Q. 711, 742-45
(1993).7The political disputes between Taiwan and China began in 1949 when the KMT gov-
ernment was driven from mainland China by the CCP. In order to mediate the dependence
on the Chinese market and in consideration of national security, Taiwan designed the "no
haste, be patient" economic policy toward China. On the matter of economic cooperation
between the two sides (China and Taiwan), Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui on January
7th 1998 explained Taiwan's "no haste, be patient" policy on investment in mainland China
by saying that the policy is "aimed at protecting Taiwan's entrepreneurs and Taiwan's over-
all interests." See Maurice Hinchey, Congratulating President Lee, Taiwan Research Insti-
tute (Feb. 5, 1998) <http://www.taiwaninformation.org/view/speecheslhinchey-
020598.html>. Furthermore, in July 1999, President Lee also declared that Taiwan intended
to apply a "special state-to-state" policy with China which increased the political tension
over the Taiwan Strait. See Johanna Mc Gerary, Playing with Fire, TIME, July 26, 1999, at
62-3.
8See CARL-JOHAN LINDGREN ET AL., BANK SOUNDNESS AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY 46
(1996) (finding that banking system soundness reflects in large measure the health of the
economy).
9See Sung Yun-Wing, Patterns of Economic Interdependence in the National Economic
Territory, in SOUTHERN CHINA, HONG KONG, AND TAIWAN: EVOLUTION OF A SUBREGIONAL
ECONOMY 14 (Jane Khanna ed., 1995).
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the other.'0 Therefore, the liberalization and globalization of the CEA's fi-
nancial sectors serve to further promote the CEA's economic development
and speed the internationalization of the domestic financial industry."
The prosperity of the CEA's economy has led a number of foreign fi-
nancial institutions to establish offices in the CEA in order to participate in
its financial markets for decades. While foreign financial institutions have
substantially contributed to the development in CEA,12 foreign financial in-
stitutions operating in Hong Kong, China and Taiwan are, however, sub-
jected to a two-tiered system of regulation. The region in which a
corporation operates determines how it will be treated.
National treatment is applied to a different degree in different coun-
tries. Foreign financial institutions operating in Taiwan and Hong Kong are
treated in a manner similar to domestic institutions. In contrast, foreign fi-
nancial institutions operating in China are treated very differently from their
domestic counterparts. Responding to the requirements of foreign institu-
tions and preparing to apply for membership to the World Trade Organiza-
tion ("WTO"),13 China is considering reforming its regulations to encourage
further international participation in financial services. 4
'0See Sean Becketti & Gordon H Sellon, Jr. Has Financial Market Volatility Increased?,
in FINANCIAL MARKET VOLATILITY AND THE ECONOMY 3, 4 (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City ed., 1990) (exploring the possible links between financial market volatility, the func-
tioning of the financial system, and aggregate economic behavior).
1 As used in this article, "financial liberalization" refers to the relaxation of restrictions
of financial activities, such as the deregulation of interest rates, the liberalization of foreign
exchange rates, and the relaxation of restrictions on capital. In addition, liberalization eases
both business restrictions and barriers to entry in the financial services sectors. See Alan
Greenspan, The Globalization of Finance, 17(3) CATO J., 243-50 (1998) (emphasizing that
the liberalization of international trade and the development of technology furthers the glob-
alization of financial markets that shapes deregulation, promotes the removal of barriers, and
enhances the flow of capital). "Financial globalization," in contrast, refers to the use and ac-
commodation of funds by all kinds of economic agents in world financial markets. See A. T.
Aburachis, International Financial Markets Integration: An Overview, in INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION 26, 37 (Stanley R. Stansell ed., 1993).
12 This is similar to the case of Poland, a former communist country that had success
transforming its economic system from a communist to a market-oriented model. This case
provides a model for China to privatize its state-owed enterprise. See Thomas S. Mond-
schean & Timothy P. Opiela, Banking Reform in a Transition Economy: The Case of Poland,
in ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 16, 26 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ed., 1996) (providing
evidence that the role of foreign financial institutions in Poland's transition economy was to
help the banking system expand to meet the needs of Poland's growing economy, and ex-
plaining further that competition from foreign banks induced Polish banks to become more
efficient and offer customers better services).
13The World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO] is designed to facilitate international
cooperation on trade and economic relations. The WTO, which came into being on January
1, 1995, enforces the General Agreement on Tariffs of Trade [hereinafter GATT] according
to the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. The WTO was created by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations [hereinafter Final Act], which closed Dec. 15, 1993,
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Thus, in the future, access to the WTO may enable the CEA to further
integrate with the world economy by lowering import barriers, and in-
creasing the transparency and predictability of trade. Hong Kong has been
a member of the WTO since 1986,5 while Taiwan16 and China 17 are apply-
ing for membership to the WTO. While in the process of applying for
WTO membership, both Taiwan and China have been accepted as WTO
observers. Because Taiwan and China are the larger economic entities out-
side the WTO, the induction of all CEA members into the WTO will instill
market discipline and create trade opportunities with other WTO mem-
bers.'8
Globalization of trade was a catalyst for this integration which will al-
low China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan to form a financial region similar to the
European Union.19 Such potential financial integration is likely to expedite
the flow of capital to promote the growth of the CEA's economies. In ad-
Art. I, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994), and the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, which were signed on April 15, 1994. Although the WTO enforces the
GATT, the GATT remains the foundation for international trade law.
14 See China to Lift Restrictions on Foreign Bank Branches Beijing, Asia Pulse April 1,
1999, <http://www.asiapulse.com> (reporting that the People's Bank of China announced
permission for foreign to establish regional branches in 1999 in a less restrictive manner than
under previous regulations).
"5 Hong Kong was granted admission to the WTO's predecessor, the GAT', as a separate
customs territory from Britain in 1986. Hong Kong will keep its WTO status as China
wages battle for membership after July 1, 1997. See Donald Clark, GAYT Membership for
China?, 17 U. PuGET SouND L.Rav. 517 (1994). To avoid any possible objections from
China to Taiwan's application for WTO membership, Taiwan did not use its national name,
the Republic of China, but applied for WTO membership as a customs territory as the Cus-
toms Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. See Ing-Wen Tsai & Connie Guang-
Hwa Yang, Taiwan's GATT Accession & The Changing Environment for Competition and
Antitrust Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF COMPETITION LAWS 297, 298
(Chia-Jui Cheng, et al. eds., 1995).
16Taiwan applied to join the WTO's predecessor, GATT, as an independent customs ter-
ritory in 1990, while China filed its application in 1986. As of March 1998, Taiwan has held
talks with the United States and twenty-five other WTO members since the early 1990's. Of
the twenty-six members that sought talks with Taiwan, twenty-four have reached agreements
with Taiwan and twenty-three have signed pacts, leaving only the European Union and Swa-
ziland outstanding. Prospective WTO members must complete bilateral trade negotiations
with any WTO member that requests such talks in order to become eligible for entry.
17China expressed a strong desire to rejoin the WTO in the late 1980's. On July 10,
1986, China submitted an application to GATT demanding a restoration of signatory status.
See Clark, supra note 15, at 517. In 1987, the GATT established a China Work Group to
process China's application. See China and the World Trading, 19 WTO Focus, May 1997,
at 5. On November 15, 1999, China and the United States signed an agreement which fa-
cilitates China's admission to the WTO in the year 2000. See China an the WTO, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, at 25-27.
81id. (analyzing the entry of China into the WTO will bind China by international trade
rules).
19See China and the WTO, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997, at 15.
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dition, an integrated CEA financial system would also become part of the
international financial market.20 Furthermore, the integration of the CEA's
financial sector will discourage the further development of the "under-
ground financial system" such as that which now links Shanghai, Hong
Kong, and Taipei.
In order to extend the scope of trade from goods to services including
financial services, telecommunication services, specific commitments, and
professional services, 22 multilateral standards for the open trade of services
were initially proposed and discussed in the 1986 Uruguay Round of the
23GATT negotiations. These multilateral standards for financial services
were adopted as the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"). 24
With respect to the application of free trade to financial services, the GATS
addresses the liberalization of financial services and non-discriminatory
market access for firms of WTO signatories.
Ratification of the GATS full-market access proposal, which was
agreed upon by seventy WTO members on December 13, 199725 and the
20See Institute of International Banker, GLOBAL SURVEY [hereinafter Global Survey]
1998 (Sept. 1998) (noting that no country can escape the global financial system under the
trends towards globalization of financial markets and convergence of regulatory system
around the world).21 Interview with Professor Edward Friedman, Hawkins Professor of Political Science at
the University of Wisconsin, in Madison, Wisconsin (Apr. 25, 1997) (stating that under the
current political situation, there are no formal channels for financial transactions between
Taiwan and China. Thus, to meet current needs, Taiwan's investors have cooperated with
Hong Kong and China in establishing an informal underground banking system, which fun-
nels Taiwanese funds into China).22See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994).23The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187.24The General Agreement on Trade in Service [hereinafter "GATS"] brought the service
industry into the WTO, which became the umbrella organization for the GATT. See GATT:
Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
2While the discouraging effect of financial market turmoil in Southeast Asia at the end
of 1997 weighed heavily in the GATS negotiations, on December 13, 1997 seventy countries
reached an agreement to open their financial institutions to foreigners. The negotiations
were part of the unfinished agendas of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations,
which concluded in 1993. The first offers to liberalize trade in financial services made dur-
ing the Uruguay Round were approved in 1995 in an interim agreement, which entered into
force on September 1, 1996. See Helene Cooper, WTO Reaches Accords as Asians Agree to
Open Finance Industry to Foreigners, WALL ST. J. Dec. 15, 1997 at A3 . Seventy members
of the World Trade Organization have taken part in the financial services negotiations which
began in April, 1997. One hundred and two governments have made commitments in the
financial services market under the GATS. The results of the GATS negotiation were part of
a protocol, which was open for governments to accept until January 29, 1999. The GATS
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approval of the GATS, which has been in force since March 1, 1999,26 have
influenced the structure of international finance. 7 In order to protect the
sovereignty of the member states to the greatest extent possible,28 the
WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, which is charged with resolving dis-
putes among members and compelling members to obey the obligations of
the WTO's principles and agreements, 29 assists the GATS in achieving re-
ciprocal solutions, rather than national treatment for regional banking in-
stitutions.3" In addition, the GATS liberalization principle is likely to
facilitate the CEA's gradual integration with global financial markets.
agreement will entered into force on March 1, 1999. See WTO Reaches Accords on Finan-
cial services, Ban's Banking Report, Dec. 22, 1997.26Following the signature of the WTO financial services accords, thirty-five countries
completed domestic legislative procedures to open banking, insurance, and securities mar-
kets to foreign competition. See World Trade Organization - Financial Service Accord,
FINANCIAL TIMES, January 23/24 1999, at 4.
27 See France William, Hope High for Financial Service Pact, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sep-
tember 19, 1997, at 12.28 To encourage a more rule-oriented approach to dispute resolution than had previously
characterized GATT disputes, the WTO adopted the understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter "DSU"]. See Final Act, supra note 13,
Art II, Ann. 2 (DSU), Art. IV-V. Supranational dispute resolution is necessary in order to
infuse the settlement of international trade disputes with impartiality and fairness, character-
istics foreign plaintiffs may find lacking in national courts and a national review process that
may be tainted with protectionism or national interest. Independent third party adjudication
also furthers the development of predictable rules that can provide guidance to diplomats and
entrepreneurs. See John H. Jackson, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION CONSTITUTION AND
JURISPRUDENCE 2 (1998).29The dispute settlement procedure is one of the WTO's most important contributions to
the stability of the global economy. Without enforcement, the rules-based system would be
worthless. The WTO's procedure underscores the rule of law, and it makes the trading sys-
tem more secure and predictable. It is clearly structured, with flexible timetables set for
completing a case. First rulings are made by a panel. Appeals based on points of law are
possible. All final rulings or decisions are made by the WTO's full membership. No single
country can block these. See Jackson, id. at 68.30The GATS is the first multilateral agreement to provide legally enforceable rights to
trade in all services. With a built-in commitment to continuous liberalization through peri-
odic negotiations, the GATS covers not just cross-border trade but every possible means of
supplying a service, including the right to set up a commercial presence in the export market.
See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services under GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A
Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 37,47 (1995).
The GATS has three basic principles: first, it covers all services except those provided in
the exercise of governmental authority; second, it prohibits discrimination in favor of na-
tional providers -- the national treatment principle; and third, it prohibits discrimination be-
tween Members of the Agreement -- the most-favored-nation principle [hereinafter "MFN"].
Id. at 98. The GATS powerfully requests that no tariff or other generalized protection
mechanism is applied in services. Nevertheless, in order to take into account the individual
situation of member states, the GATS does provide important exceptions to all three of these
principles. First, governments can choose the services in which they make market access
and national treatment commitments. Id. at 68. Second, they can limit the degree of market
access and national treatment they provide. Id. Third, they can create exceptions to the
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Under the GATS, Taiwan and China will have to make some adjust-
ments to their policies regarding the "national treatment" of foreign finan-
cial institutions.3 ' Hong Kong, however, already requires equal treatment
for banking institutions from every region.32 China welcomes foreign
banks from most regions, but treats foreign institutions differently from
their domestic counterparts.33 Taiwan offers equal treatment for banks from
every region, except for China. Thus, Taiwan allows the establishment of
branches in Taiwan for foreign banks whose home country also empowers
Taiwan's banks to operate in its jurisdictions.34 As a prerequisite for WTO
access, Taiwan may encounter some pressure to accord "Most Favored Na-
tion" ("MFN")35 status to China and thus to permit China's financial insti-
tutions to enter its domestic markets. Similarly, China may be required to
treat domestic and foreign banks equally. By lowering financial barriers,
China and Taiwan will have greater opportunities to conduct business with
one another.
Participation in the international financial market will promote in-
creased financial integration within the CEA. To encourage further prog-
ress in the area of financial services, the CEA should work toward
combating the disparities among the financial systems of China, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan. Comprehensive financial integration of the CEA will
be facilitated by the implementation of the supervisory regulations of the
Basle Accords, issued by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
("Basle Committee"). 36 The Basle Accords recommend strengthening in-
Most Favored Nation status obligation, in principle only for ten years, in order to give more
favorable treatment to some countries. Id.
3 'National treatment is addressed in GATS, art XVII(1) (defining national treatment in
the area of financial services as requiring equality of competitive opportunity between for-
eign and domestic firms has been maintained. However, equality of competitive opportunity
does not require identical treatment of foreign and domestic financial institutions. Differen-
tial treatment is sometimes necessary to accommodate legal and regulatory systems and
banking structures in a domestic country that differ from those in foreign countries).32See US DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 1998 NATIONAL TREATMENT STUDY [herein-
after "National Treatment"] 218 (1998).33National Treatment, Id. at 177.34National Treatment, Id. at 456.35The term MFN in GATS refers to the equal treatment that each state of the WTO
should accord to all other state parties. See Final Act, supra note 13, art II, § 2, in 1 Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 137 (1994). Because of this cornerstone
provision of the VTO, once China and Taiwan become WTO members, China's financial
institutions can establish their branches in Taiwan similar to the manner in which other for-
eign institutions from WTO states have established branches. See GATS, supra note 24.36The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision [hereinafter Basle Committee] was es-
tablished at the end of 1974 at the Bank for International Settlements at Basle, Switzerland.
The Basle Committee is endorsed by the Central Bank Governors of the Group of Ten (now
twelve countries) comprised of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Neth-
erlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Luxembourg and Switzerland
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temational financial supervision and promoting international coordination
to prevent international financial crises.
The goal of the Basle Committee is to strengthen the supervision of
international financial activities by unifying diverse approaches to these ac-
tivities.37 The Basle Committee is an informal group and the Basle Accords
are not legally binding. However, as a result of the wide acceptance of the
Basle Accords by the international financial sector,3 8 the Basle Accords
qualify as "soft law.,
39
Soft law exhibits distinctive advantages over hard law in areas where
agreements are difficult or not viable.40 A soft law is an international con-
vention recognized by a group of specific national authorities and adopted
into their nations' laws or administrative codes. Soft law is a concept in
international law designed to provide legal terms or informal duties without
requiring the adoption of formal or informal treaties or agreements. 41 Fur-
joined later). See Ethan B. Kapstein, SUPERVISING INTERNATIONAL BANKS: ORIGINS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BASLE ACCORD 185 (Int'l Fin. Section Essay No. 185, 1991).
The goal of establishing the Basle Committee was to achieve an international agreement
on standards of good practice and collaboration in international banking supervision. See id.
at 5-6. Additionally, the Basle Committee has created a body of recommended banking su-
pervisory standards, known as the Basle Accords. See id. at 6. However, because the Basle
Accords lack legal validity or binding force, the effective enforcement of the Basle Accords
depends on each authority's willingness and preference to enforce them. See id.
37 Since 1975, the Basle Committee has strengthened the supervision of international
banking by unifying approaches to supervising cross-border banking activities and issuing
recommendations. See Committee on Banking and Supervisory Practices; Revised Basle
Concordat on Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, 22 I.L.M.
900 (1983).38The Basle Accords have been fully implemented by all Basle Committee member
counties. A number of nonmember countries with significant international banking presence
have either adopted or are working to adopt the Basle Accords. Further, adherence to the
Basle Accords has resulted in a buildup of banking capital funds. See Joseph J. Norton &
Christopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Process of International Bank Regulatory and Supervi-
sory Convergence: A New Regulatory-Market "Partnership," 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L.
227,241 (1997).39For more information and discussion about "soft law," see generally Jonathan Carlson,
Hunger, Agriculture Trade Liberalization, and Soft International Law: Addressing the Legal
Dimensions of a Political Problem, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1187 (1985); John King Gamble, Jr.,
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as Soft Law, 8 HOUSTON J. INT'L
L. 37 (1985); Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrange-
ments, 77 Am. J.INT'L L. 443, 443 (1983); Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for
Understanding "Soft Law, " 30 MCGILL L. J. 37 (1984); W. Riphagen, From Soft Law to Jas
Cogens and Back, 17 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 81 (1987); and K. C. Wellens & G.
M. Borchardt, Soft Law in European Community Law, 14 EUR. L. REV. 267 (1989).
40The term "hard law" or "firm law" means a signed treaty or agreement that is precisely
worded and which specifies the exact obligations undertaken or the rights granted. See C.
M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 850, 851 (Oct. 1989).
41 See Francis Snyder, SOFT LAW AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 2 (1993).
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ther, soft law presumes consent to basic principles of law, especially in
rapidly developing fields such as international financial regulation.
By using mutual-recognition, moral persuasion, and market practices,
soft law allows a country the flexibility to implement rules while taking into
account different regulatory systems.42  The more countries and interna-
tional organizations adopt the Basle Accords, the more the Basle Accords
function as soft law. As a result of applying the theory of soft law, the Basle
Committee is able to exert its influence even though it does not have the
authority to impose a new international legal framework or to interfere with
national sovereignty.43
This article initially reviews the current development of financial
services that converge regulatory systems around the world.44 Along with
focusing on banking and securities, this article assesses financial systems
and regulators within China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan respectively. The
evaluation of the CEA's financial system is based on recommendations is-
sued by the Basle Committee. In addition, with respect to the principle of
national treatment, this article evaluates the operations of foreign financial
institutions in the CEA. In the future, participation in the WTO will enable
the CEA to experience greater growth and increase its participation in the
internationalization of financial sectors. This article argues that the imple-
mentation of the Basle Accords as soft law is important for the establish-
ment of a sound financial system in the CEA. This article concludes with
an evaluation of the prospects of future financial development in the CEA.
I1. ORIGINS OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL AND BANKING SYSTEMS IN THE
CHINESE ECONOMIC AREA
The members of the CEA, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, have each
developed their own unique financial systems that reflect their diverse po-
litical, economic, and historical roots. China organized a state-owned
banking system to support its economic development in accordance with
Marxian doctrines.45 By contrast, Hong Kong and Taiwan enforce market-
oriented economics. However, while Hong Kong developed free-market
42See Carlson, supra note 39, at 1203.43See Thomas F. Mclnerney III, Note, Towards the Next Phase in International Banking
Regulation, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L. J. 143, 155 (1994).
"Theoretically, financial institutions refer to business organization that offer a broad
base of financial services or specialize in specific functions, productions, or services. Finan-
cial institutions include commercial banks, thrift institutions, investment banks (merchant
banks) credit unions, pension funds, mutual funds, investment companies, insurance compa-
nies, securities brokers and dealers, real estate investment trusts, stock exchanges, and oth-
ers. Unless otherwise indicated, financial institutions in the article insinuate banks
(including commercial and investment banks) and securities. See K. J. Thygerson,
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS (1993).45For more detail discussion about the Marxian Doctrine, see Joseph A. Schumpeter,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 1-45 (3 r ed. 1942).
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economic policies favoring financial markets, Taiwan built its financial
system on a predominately state-owned banking model because of its con-
cem for national security. In spite of adopting diverse policies to construct
individual financial systems, each member of the CEA benefits from the fi-
nancial market development.
From a Western perspective, China's financial system is outmoded and
extremely fragile. All of China's banks are state-owned, woefully under-
capitalized, and literally function as cashiers to state-owned enterprises.
Under these conditions, banks have still played a large role in China's re-
formed economy as financiers. 46 In addition, China's banks have also is-
sued large undisclosed amounts of non-performing loans to state
enterprises. As a consequence, Chinese banks' outstanding loan portfolio
equaled about ninety percent of the country's gross domestic product in
1995. 47 In light of the state-owned enterprises' outstanding bank debts,
China has proposed radical commercialization of its deficit-ridden public
businesses.
The formation of the People's Bank of China ("PBOC") reflects these
new reforms. In order to Westernize China's financial system, the PBOC
became the central bank of China in 1983 and the lender of last resort for
state-run banks.49 Rather than use a single centralized bank, China sepa-
rated the businesses of the commercial banks into four consolidated, state-
controlled commercial banks, effectively creating four new state-run
banks.
50
46See Liu Hongru, Development in the Reform of China's Banking and Financial Sys-
tems, 2 J. CHINESE L. 324 (1988) (finding that because they are under highly centralized
control, China's banks traditionally played the passive roles of bookkeepers and cashiers).47The failure to resolve these banks' bad loans will slow China's long-term economic
success. China's financial institutions' total outstanding loans expanded from under 200
billion renminbi in 1978 (when reforms began) to more than 5 trillion renminbi at the end of
1995. See David J. Ratway, Note and Comment: National Depositor Preference: In an At-
tempt to Raise Revenues, Congress Completely Ignores a Potential Disaster, 19 NOVA L.
REv. 1121, 1140 (Spring 1995). Loans outstanding at the outset of reform were about half
of the gross domestic product in 1978. Id. In 1995, the portfolio of loans outstanding was
equal to ninety percent of gross domestic product. Id.
48See Anthony Spaeth, MeetingJiang Zemin, TIME, October 27, 1997, at 56.49China's State Council, Measures on the People's Bank of China, promulgated on Sep-
tember 12, 1983, required that the People's Bank of China undertake all central banking
functions and bear responsibility for the reform of China's banking sector. See I.A. Tokley
& Tina Ravn, BANKING LAW IN CHINA 13 (1997).
5 Under the Interim Regulations on Bank Management of the PRC Concerning the Ad-
ministration of Banks ordered on January 7, 1986, China created four policy banks to sepa-
rate commercial-lending business from the People's Bank of China. See D.K. Srivastava
and Wang Chenguang, The Role of the Central Bank of China, in LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
CHINA: MARKET ECONOMY AND LAW, 217 225 (Wang Guiguo and Wei Zhenying eds.,
1996).
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In 1994, China converted four "specialized" banks to control the do-
mestic banking system of commercial banks by transferring the responsi-
bility of making non-commercial loans to three newly established "policy"
banks. These "policy" banks include: the Import-Export Bank, which helps
finance major trade deals, the State Development Bank, which funds infra-
structural projects, and the Agricultural Development Bank of China, which
funds agricultural procurement for rural development.
Meanwhile, several other banks were established. These include: the
Bank of Communication, the China International Trust and Investment
Corporation Industrial Bank, the Hun Xia Bank and the China Investment
Bank. 5' In addition to the problems presented the transition of non-
commercial banking interests from the PBOC, these newly established fi-
nancial institutions also suffer from a high default rate on loans granted.
This problem remains an area of concern. To protect state-owned banks
from defaulted loans, the PBOC created a finance management company in
April of 1999. This company is similar to the Restructure Trust Company,
which accepts the bad loans of state-owned banks.5 2
Furthermore, China's dynamic economic development over the past
two decades Provided incentives for opening its markets to foreign financial
institutions. Following increased capital inflows, new technological im-
provements, and foreign banks' market-oriented approach, China's banking
sector faces increasing competition.
The success of open-economic development has also promoted China's
extremely active but unsophisticated securities markets, and therefore re-
quires greater regulation than currently exists. On December 29, 1998,
China passed the Securities Law, which the National People's Congress
Standing Committee adopted, and will take effect on July 1, 1999. While
application of uniform securities regulations exists, China's securities mar-
kets remain segmented not only by the types of the securities traded, but
also by geographic area. Foreign brokers are allowed to deal only in "B"
shares, 54 which do not enjoy many of the benefits common to normal Chi-
nese securities. In addition, the liquidity of "B" shares is severely re-
stricted; "B" shares cannot be traded with the same immediacy or volume as
51 See Huang Yang Xin, REVAMPING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CHINESE BANKING
CRITICAL EXAMINATION SYSTEM 10 (1996).52See PBOC Will Establish The First Finance Management Company, WORLD J., March
27, 1999, at D4 (Chin.).53See Toney Walker, Chinese Growth 'under Threat,' FIN. TIMES at 4 (repeating that the
World Bank's report that China's vibrant economic led foreign institution to establish office
in China).
m"B" shares are one kind of Chinese domestic security that can only be purchased by
foreign investors with foreign currencies rather than with renminbi. See I.A. Tokley & Tina
Ravn, COMPANY AND SECURTES LAW 71 (1998).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:1 (1999)
regular "A" shares.5 5 Further amending regulations to loosen restrictions on
foreign investors is required to develop a more efficient and consistent se-
curities market in China.
Compared to China's closed and state-owned financial system, Hong
Kong is synonymous with the free and open market. On July 1, 1997, Hong
Kong was transferred to China as a Special Administrative Region
("SAR").56 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion of the People's Republic of China57 is specified in China's "One
country; Two systems" framework58 as the equivalent of Hong Kong's con-
stitution. It includes specific provisions designed to preserve Hong Kong as
a world-class financial center. 9 Under the Banking Ordinance 6 amended
on June 28, 1995, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority ("HKMA") func-
tions as the central bank of Hong Kong monitoring banking operations and
dictating monetary policy. In addition, the main purpose of the HKMA is
to promote the financial and economic growth of the SAR. Recently, the
HKMA created a mortgage corporation, one of several measures enacted to
ensure the future success of Hong Kong as a financial center.61
The Securities and Futures Commission ("SFC") is in charge of en-
suring the integrity of the stock and futures markets and protecting inves-
tors. In order to increase the stability of, and worldwide investors'
confidence in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong ("SEHK"), 62 Hong Kong
instituted reforms in its securities and exchange systems in 1987.3 Despite
55"A" shares were designed for the Chinese domestic investors by trading with only re-
minbi. Id.56For background analysis of the Special Administrative Region, see Ian Dobinson &
Derek Roebuck, INTRODUCTION TO LAW IN THE HONG KONG SAR (1996).57See generally Basic Law, supra note 2. The Basic Law, which is the constitutional law
of Hong Kong, is probably the only document enumerating the commitment to maintain
Hong Kong's status as an international financial center.58In 1987, China introduced the "One Country: Two systems" framework to resolve the
difference between China's socialist legal system and Hong Kong's colonial democratic and
liberal government. See Xianglong, Dai, One State, Two Currencies, BANKER, Nov. 1996, at
100-01. The "One Country: Two systems" approach refers to the operation of a capitalist
system in Hong Kong separate from China's socialist system. Id. This arrangement is
China's first experimentation with federalism. If successful, China is likely to attempt to re-
unite Taiwan by offering a similar proposal to Taiwan.
59 See Roda Mushkat, ONE COUNTRY, TWO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE
CASE OF HONG KONG 33 (1997).
6°The Banking Ordinan'ce, the title of Hong Kong banking law, was enacted in 1948 and
amended in 1964, 1986, and 1995.61 See Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Hong Kong's Monetary Arrangements through
1997,60 (1998).62The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong [hereinafter "SEHK"] ranked ninth largest in the
world in market capitalization in 1997, however, down from sixth largest in 1993 partly be-
cause of regional financial turmoil in late 1997.63 In line with wide-ranging recommendations made by a Securities Review Committee
appointed in the wake of the 1987 market crash, Hong Kong considerably strengthened op-
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these reforms, Hong Kong's securities market has experienced a change of
focus from private companies to "red chip" companies.
4
This shift reflects an eroding public confidence in private companies
and indicates that investors will hedge, given the new Chinese sovereignty
of Hong Kong.6 5 Although the Hong Kong market is widely considered
one of the most liberal securities systems in the world, a stable relationship
between Hong Kong and China is very important to ensure the vitality of
the Hong Kong securities market.
The financial approach adopted in Taiwan is different from both
China's state-owned system and Hong Kong's free market system. Taiwan
chose the unique approach of solidly conservative financial policies for the
organization of its financial system in response to the 1946-49 Chinese
banking collapse. The Chinese collapse was a result of the Communist
Party's manipulation of a number of private financial institutions. 66 A fi-
nancial disaster undermined the people's confidence and constituted one of
the major factors forcing the Kuomintang ("KMT") regime to leave
China.6 ' The KMT relocated to Taiwan and formed a state-owned financial
system in an attempt to avoid future financial problems similar to the 1946-
49 banking collapse. Accordingly, banks dominated Taiwan's financial
system until early 1992, when Taiwan granted licenses to fifteen private
banks, more than doubling the number in existence.
Taiwan recently promoted the privatization of state-owned banks in
1997. Taiwan hopes that transferring governmental activities to the private
sector may increase management efficiency and operational competitive-
ness. 69 Acknowledging that onerous government regulations decreased the
eration and regulation of Hong Kong's stock and futures markets. See The Securities and
Futures Commission of Hong Kong [hereinafter SFC], Historical Background to the SFC
<http://www.hksfc.org.hk/eng/index.htm>.
6"Red Chip" stocks refer to shares of Chinese companies registered in Hong Kong in
which Chinese corporations hold at least 30 percent interest and were estimated to account
for 12 percent of the SEHK's market capitalization as of April 30, 1998. See also infra note
189.65 See Moody's Investors Service, Banking System Outlook: Hong Kong, A New Operat-
ing Environment is the Key Challenge for Hong Kong's Banks, 5 (1997).
6See In Defense of Taiwan, TIME, Oct. 18, 1997, at 72 (stating that to maintain financial
stability, Taiwan's government frequently adopts extreme caution in monitoring financial
market activities, which is primarily attributed to Taiwan's apprehension over national secu-
rity).67See Jia-Don Shea, Taiwan: Development and Structural Change of the Financial Sys-
tem, in THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, KOREA, AND TAIWAN, 222, 230 (Hugh T.
Patrick & Yung Chul Park eds., 1994)
6 8See Brian Wallace Semkow, TAIWAN'S CAPITAL MARKET REFORM: THE FINANCIAL
AND LEGAL IssuEs 30 (1994).69See Deborah Shen, Standard & Poor's Rates Financial Condition AA+, FREE CHINA J.
Nov. 14, 1997, at 3 (reporting that without the legislature's strict screening and onerous ad-
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productivity of state-owned banks, Taiwan gathered the National Develop-
ment Conference in December 1996. This conference examined attempts to
privatize state-run banks by reducing state-owned shares to under forty per-
cent 0.7  The continuing effort to privatize state-owned banks is intended to
ensure their survival in a newly liberalized and globalized atmosphere. 7,
Financial supervision in Taiwan is currently handled by three agencies:
the Central Bank of China, the Ministry of Finance, and the Central Deposit
Insurance Corporation.72 Since the current multi-agency system results in
overlapping duties and unclear lines of responsibility, Taiwan's financial
reforms must ultimately also include the clear designation of a new finan-
cial supervisory agency that mixes insurance, banking, and securities.
Taiwan needs a sophisticated financial system in order to establish a
regional financial center73 and gain WTO approval. Although Taiwan has
defacto self-determination,74 Taiwan does not receive de jure recognition
75
from the international community due to China's boycott.76 By participat-
ing in international organizations, Taiwan will be able to receive more
benefits and greater exposure to the international community.
ministrative approval procedure, privatization of state-owned banks will boost efficiency and
competitiveness).70Taiwan reduced the shareholding rate to privatize state-owned banks. The provincial
government's shareholdings in Chang Hwa Commercial Bank, First Commercial Bank, and
Hua Nan Commercial Bank have been cut to 30.72 percent, 21.05 percent, and 41.26 per-
cent, respectively. See Deborah Shen, Three Provincial Government Banks Privatized, FREE
CHINA J., Feb. 6, 1996.7 1 See Waiting is over for 'Big Three', BANKER, July 1997, at 68. (reporting that a growth
of domestic private banks and competition from foreign banks promoted the privatization of
Taiwan's three major state-owned banks).72This Deposit Insurance Act [hereinafter "DIA"], passed on January 9, 1985 and
amended on Januaary 20, 1999, created the Central Deposit Insurance Company [hereinafter
"CDIC'I. In addition to supervising the Basic-Level Financial Institutions (credit co-
operatives, credit departments of the farmers' association and the fisherman's' associations),
the CDIC took over the Cooperative Bank of Taiwan in June 1996. Art. 21 of the DIA em-
powers the CDIC with the right to examine any bank that is under the umbrella of CDIC in-
surance.
7 3 See Laura Tyson, Growing Demands for Diverse Products, FIN. TIMES, October 7,
1997, at III.
74De facto self-determination means the ability of a people to determine their own fate in
a democratic way.75Dejure recognition is legitimate or lawful. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 425 (6th ed.
1990).76 While a clear national identity may be psychologically attractive to certain political
movements in Taiwan, there is clearly greater security for the Taiwanese people in political
ambiguity. According to "one country; two systems," Taiwan is part of China through hav-
ing a different political or economic system; China is the only representative of entire China,
which also includes Hong Kong and Macao. China will not agree with any country who has
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Deng Xioping, Deng Xioping's Talk with Yang Liyu, in
DENG XOPING WENSUAN [Selected Works of Deng Xioping] 230 (1993).
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Taiwan's securities market, including a stock exchange and an over-
the-counter market, is extremely prosperous. However, the securities mar-
kets are over-dependent on governmental interference for their stability.
77
Rampant manipulation of Taiwan's securities markets accentuates the need
for a neutral regulator.78 Governmental influence would be more beneficial
in regulating the dissemination of financial information to ensure greater
accuracy and assessment of financial functions. Further, governmental
regulation of insider information and disclosure policies is needed to curb
the trend toward corruption.
I. TAIWAN: A VIBRANT ECONOMY FORCES FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
The growth of Taiwan's financial market has evolved from Taiwan's
stable economic environment during the past decades. In terms of the rela-
tionship between economic and financial development, Taiwan's impres-
sive economic performance7 9 stimulated the development of its financial
sectors. Taiwan's securities market is lively in terms of daily trading value,
but it suffers from a lack of information transparency. Although Taiwan
also has twenty of the largest banks in the world,80 the Taiwanese govern-
ment's oversight of Taiwan's financial sector has gradually restricted
growth in order to maintain greater stability.
Taiwan changed the character of its financial policies from conserva-.
tive to prudential by the gradual removal of financial regulations. In order
to liberalize its financial system, Taiwan began deregulating interest rates to
establish the money market in 1976.81 In the securities market, Taiwan
amended its Securities Exchange Law to deregulate restrictions on invest-
ment to the securities market in 1988.82 Subsequently, Taiwan amended its
Banking Law83 in 1989, 1992, and 1995.84 These amendments chartered
77See Shea, supra note 67, at 248-249.7 8 Id. at 232.
79Taiwan's economy has grown at an average annual rate of 8.5 percent between 1952
and 1997. Even during the worldwide economic downturn, Taiwan managed a 5.87 percent
growth rate in 1993. In 1997, Taiwan was the fourteenth largest trading nation with a trad-
ing volume of $236.5 billion (unless otherwise indicated, the currency unit appearing in this
paper is in US$). Taiwan's Gross National Product ("GNP") of $84.8 billion was the twen-
tieth 20th largest in the world, and per capita GNP was the twenty-fifth highest in the world
in 1993. See MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OF TAIWAN, Current Status of Economic De-
velopment <http://www.moea.gov.tw/-meco/lIntro_e/xmoel.htm>.
8°See Michael Blanden, Top 1000 Banks: Big is Beautiful, BANKER, July 1997, at 96.8t See Kuo-Shu Liang, The Banking System and Financial Reform, in INT'L CONF. ON
DEREGULATION AND REGS. 16, 30 (Jeremy P. Moyes ed. 1994).82Taiwan Securities Exchange Law [hereinafter "SEL"] was enacted in 1968 with 168
articles divided into nine chapters. The SEL has already been amended four times in 1970,
1972, 1977, and 1997.83The Banking Law of the Republic of China (1995) [hereinafter Taiwan's Banking
Law], with seven chapters and 140 articles, is the primary banking statute in Taiwan. Tai-
wan's Banking Law describes the powers and duties of all banks in Taiwan, both domestic
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banking licenses to private applicants and confirmed the need for interna-
tional banking and deregulation. Other amendments to the Banking Law in
1992 and 1995 enlarged the scope of banking operations.8
To promote its entry into the WTO, Taiwan organized a Financial Re-
form Task Force in February 1997. The Financial Reform Task Force is
designed to accelerate the liberalization of financial services and create fi-
nancial market discipline under comprehensive supervision.86 In January
1998, the Financial Reform Task force presented a new financial blueprint
for further financial reform to the government8 7
Taiwan aspires to become a regional operations center for multina-
tional corporations operating in the Asian-Pacific region by implementation
of the Plan for Developing Taiwan as an Asia-Pacific Region Operation
Center.88 An integral part of Taiwan's plan is to become another financial
and foreign, through regulations governing their operations. To date, Taiwan has had four-
teen amendments to the Banking Law. Except the 1947 amendment proclaimed in mainland
China, the other thirteen amendments were made in Taiwan after the KMT's withdrawal to
Taiwan in 1949. The promulgation of the fourteen amendments to the Banking Law were
passed on September 1, 1947; June 16, 1950; November 11, 1968; July 4, 1975; December
29, 1977; July 19, 1978; December 5, 1979; December 5, 1980; July 17, 1981; May 20,
1985; July 17, 1989; October 30, 1992; June 29, 1995, and 1997. For a background in the
Banking Law of the ROC, see Li-Chung Lee, What Next for Banking in Taiwan, AM. U.
LL.M. INT'L BULL., 11-14 (Sum. 1994); and Jann Kaufman Winn, Banking and Finance in
Taiwan: The Prospect for Internationalization in the 1990s, 25 INT'L LAw. 907-952 (1991).
84On July 17, 1989, Taiwan amended its Banking Law mainly to abolish the control over
interest rates, which allows banks to freely trade and determine the rate of interest. Winn,
supra note 83.
85On October 30, 1992, Taiwan promulgated an amendment of the Banking Law primar-
ily to relax restrictions on the number of bank branches and the establishment of new private
banks. In addition, foreign banks received national treatment. Id.
8'The Financial Reform Task Force ("Reform Force") is an ad hoc committee consisting
of representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of China, academics,
and industrial participants. By the end of March 1998, this Reform Force will propose a
package of financial sector reforms similar to Japan's "big bang," which is aimed at abol-
ishing the control of foreign-exchange rules in April 1998. See Laura Tyson, Growing De-
mands for Diverse Products, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, Survey at 111.871d.
881n order to finish economic liberalization and the completion of infrastructure projects
to enhance economic prowess, Taiwan proposed the Plan for Developing Taiwan as an Asia-
Pacific Region Operation Center [hereinafter APROC Plan] on January 5, 1995. See Law-
rence S. Liu, Aspiring to Excel -The Uneasy Case of Implementing Taiwan's Asia-Pacific
Regional Operations Center Plan, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN. L. 199, 201 (1996). The seven
components of the APROC Plan include a (1) macroeconomic adjustment program under
CEPD; (2) regional manufacturing center program under MDEA; (3) regional sea transpor-
tation center program under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications ("MOTC");
(4) regional air transportation center program; (5) regional financial center program under
MOTC; (6) regional telecommunications center program under MOTC; and (7) regional me-
dia center program under the Government Information Office (GIO). Taiwan is scheduled to
fully complete the APROC Plan by 2005. See id.
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center in the Western Pacific.8 9 However, to be successful, Taiwan must
move toward further financial liberalization. One area of concern for the
task force is the status of financial supervision in Taiwan.
A. Banking: Proposed Financial Reform towards More Liberalization,
Privatization, and Internationalization
Taiwan's banking system needs liberalization 9° and an improved sys-
tem of banking supervision. Taiwan made major strides toward liberaliza-
tion in 1989 after repealing barriers for the licensing of private commercial
banks.9' Nonetheless, Taiwan still maintains conservative financial poli-
cies, and financial supervision is provided through multiple agencies. The
banking sector's conservative characteristics hinder Taiwan's attempts to
evolve into a major financial center. This conservative approach also hin-
ders the development of other financial institutions. Nevertheless, Taiwan
did benefit from its conservative policies while its financial sectors suffered
little from the "financial firestorm" 92 that engulfed so many other Asian
countries in 1997.93
Taiwan's conservative financial policies were initially created in re-
sponse to the financial instability of Chinese banks before the 1949 Chinese
Civil War.94 During the period of 1945 to 1949, Mainland China suffered
from hyperinfiation. 5 Thus, Taiwanese experts and authorities designed
Taiwan's macroeconomic policies and financial structures to prevent un-
89See Lawrence S. Liu, Creating an International Financial Center: The Case of Taiwan,
ROC, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS AND PRACTICES: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
71, 76-77 (J. J. Norton et al., 1994).
9°See Financial Liberalization, supra note 11.
9 1 See Brian Wallace Semkow, TAIWAN'S FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS: THE
LEGAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES OF DEREGULATION AND INTERNATIONALIZATION 90-93 (1992)
(describing the establishment of private banks in Taiwan based on the substantive amend-
ments to the Banking Law of the Republic of China on July 19, 1989).
92While 1997's financial firestorm has blitzed many Asian countries, Taiwan has re-
mained relatively unscathed. Indeed, South Korea's sudden descent into the "abyss" of fi-
nancial difficulties was a wake-up call for Taiwan, which had been complacent about the
wider impact of currency woes sweeping across Asia. See Asia and the Abyss, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 20, 1997, at 15.
93See S. P. Seth, Taiwan Least Affected by Asia's Meltdown, FREE CHINA J. Dec. 27,
1997, at 7; The Flexible Tiger, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 1998, at 73 (stating that Taiwan escaped
Asia's 1997 financial turmoil with a small currency devaluation and a relatively modest de-
cline in stock market prices based on three factors: a light foreign-debt burden; banking
regulation accomplishments; and a more flexible response to market fluctuations); Laura Ty-
son, Taiwan Keeps Markets Beast at Bay, FIN. TIMES. December 24, 1997, at 3,
94See Cynthia Owens, Taiwan: Official's Dreams of Creating Financial Center Slowed
by Regulatory Barriers, Taipei Stigma, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., July 15, 1991, at 25.
95See Shea, supra note 67.
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controlled inflation.96 Taiwan's financial institutions were controlled by
governmental agencies in light of these guidelines. Until 1992 with the
emergence of the first private bank established in Taiwan, state-owned
banks, though privatized since 1997, still dominated Taiwan's banking
system. Additionally, Taiwan paid attention to interest rates and exchange
rates to keep its market prices stabilized and reassure investors.97
Taiwan's banking system is complicated. 98 The development of Tai-
wan's banking system was heavily influenced by Japanese banking con-
cepts.99 Remnants of the Japanese financial system remained following the
Japanese occupation between 1895 and 1945.° In addition, Japan's geo-
graphic proximity to Taiwan and its sophisticated financial industry also
help to explain the similarity between the two systems.
Taiwanese banks are organized and registered in accordance with its
Banking Law.' 0 ' Taiwan's banks are classified into four categories: com-
mercial banks, saving banks, specialized banks, 10 2 and trust and investment
96 See Hung T. Patrick & Yung Chul Park, THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN,
KOREA, AND TAIwAN: GROWTH, REPRESSION, AND LIBERALIZATION 230-31 (1994).
97In the trends of Globalization of financial services, Taiwan has been pushed to switch
from conservative to prudential policies to govern banking operations. The lesson from the
failure of Chile's financial reform encouraged Taiwan to restructure its financial system in-
crementally rather than in one comprehensive reform. Taiwan started deregulation of finan-
cial markets in accordance with the market need and the stability of economic development
from the late of 1980s. See Lawrence S. Liu, Brave New World of Financial Reform in Tai-
wan, The Republic of China -- Three Waves of International and Liberalization and Beyond,
CHINESE YEARBOOK, 134, 135 (1996).
9 Taiwan's banks are divided into three categories according to the year of establish-
ment. Coincidentally, the development of the banking industry in Taiwan has also under-
gone three major phases. Banks under each category are not only similar in the general
functions performed, but also in the developmental phase during which they were estab-
lished. These three categories are (1) banks established during the Japanese occupation of
Taiwan from 1895-1945; (2) banks founded in Mainland China and subsequently re-
established in Taiwan after 1949; and (3) banks founded and established in Taiwan after
1949. See Kuo-Shu-Liang & Takeshi Ohta, Banking Models and Operation Realities in Ja-
pan and Taiwan, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: CHANGE AND
TRANSFORMATION IN THE 1990S 105-117 (J.J. Norton ed. al. 1994).
99See Lawrence L. C. Lee, Banking Supervisory Structure: The Japanese influence on
Taiwan Financial Market Development (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
1°°For example, Taiwan's postal saving networks and local credit unions continue to op-
erate like those in Japan. See Lawrence S. Liu, Taiwan: A Roadmapfor Financial Reform in
the Nineties?, EUR. INT'L FIN. L., Aug. 3, 1991.
101 Art. 2 of Taiwan Banking Law, supra note 83 (ruling that the term "bank" means an
institution organized and registered under Taiwan Banking Law hereunder to conduct bank-
ing business).
102Taiwan Banking Law defines specified banks and the scope of business delegated to
the specified banks. According to Art. 87 of Taiwan's Banking Law, "to facilitate the avail-
ability of special credit for enterprises, the central competence, the Ministry of Finance,
authorizes the establishment of special banks or may designate an existing bank to extend
such credit." Moreover, Art. 88 of the Banking Law, indicates that the special credit referred
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companies. Other financial institutions such bill finance companies, credit
cooperatives,0 3 securities firms, the postal saving system, 04 insurance
companies, and leasing companies are established in accordance with dif-
ferent laws.
Most Taiwanese banks operate under a similar universal banking
model, 05 and a multi-office-banking system 0 6 has branches throughout the
island. A few specialized banks engage in multiple banking operations that
include providing industries with medium- and long-term credit. These
specialized banks are intended to accelerate the development of certain in-
dustries designated by governmental authorities.10 7  In 1999, Taiwan li-
censed two industrial bank applicants, who will begin operation for
specified customers of advanced industries by the end of 1999.
Due to this myriad of banking institutions,0 8 restructuring the banking
supervision system is crucial to ensuring a sound multiple banking system
to in the Art. 87 is divided into 6 categories: (1) industrial credit; (2) agricultural credit; (3)
export-import credit; (4) medium and small-size enterprise credit; (5) mortgage credit; and
(6) local credit. Pursuant to the Banking Law, Taiwan has a number of specialized banks
that provide specialized credit for certain important financial market segments. These spe-
cialized banks provide medium and long-term industrial, agricultural, trade, real-estate, and
medium and small business credit. In some cases, a non-specialist bank has undertaken
these specialized functions, or a specialized bank has undertaken two or more specialized
functions. See Semkow, supra note 68 at 39.
1°3Farming and fishing associations throughout Taiwan Island also have credit depart-
ments. Credit departments handle limited banking activities and credit extension services for
their members. See Wallace Wen-Yen Wang & James Ting-Yeh Yang, Financial Institu-
tions in Taiwan: An Analysis ofthe Regularoty Scheme, 4 J. CHINESE L. 1, 11 (1990).
1°4The postal saving system was designed to encourage domestic consumer savings.
Taiwan's postal saving system has proven very popular largely as a result of the greater con-
venience offered by the large number of locations and longer working hours, ten hours from
Monday to Friday, and four hours on Saturday every other week in accordance with the new
working days policy in Taiwan since 1998.
'05The universal banking model, an opposition to specific banking, refers to a banking
institution which can perform a wide variety of financial services including taking deposits,
making loans, underwriting securities issues, dealing in precious metals and collectible
coins, and brokering real estate. See Theodor Baums & Michael Gruson, The German
Banking System--System of the Future?, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 101, 106-07 (1993).
1°6Taiwan Banking Law, art. 57 (permitting a bank to establish its branch with an ap-
proval and issuance of a business license issued by the central competent authority).
107Taiwan Banking Law, art. 86.
1°sBanks have a total of over 5,791 offices and branches throughout Taiwan. As of De-
cember 1998, Taiwan had 48 domestic banks, including 16 new private commercial banks
established in 1992, 8 medium business banks, and two of which were restructured from
trust and investment companies, as well as one which was permitted to convert from the
status of a national local credit union to a commercial bank. There were also 4 trust and in-
vestment companies, 378 credit unions, 31 domestic and foreign life insurance companies,
16 bill and finance companies, 4 securities finance company, 46 branches of foreign banks
with 75 outlets, and 26 representative offices of foreign banks from 19 countries in Taiwan.
In addition, savings deposits can be made at 1,539 Post Office outlets, established in 1930,
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in Taiwan. The current system involving multiple agencies has stunted the
development of banking supervisory techniques. Under Taiwan's Banking
Law, the Ministry of Finance ("MOF") is the central authority that ulti-
mately supervises banking activities. 1° 9
However, because human resources are limited and the histories devel-
oped, the MOF also coordinates supervision with two agencies: the Central
Bank of China ("CBC")10 and the Central Deposit Insurance Company
("CDIC").1" Under the principle of supervising financial institutions by
these three agencies, the CDIC is not responsible for examining those fi-
nancial institutions for which other supervisory agencies such as the MOF
or CBC are responsible, in accordance with the principle of "Designated
Task Assignment Guidelines of Bank examination." The CBC is responsi-
ble for older banks, those established before 1992. The MOF is responsible
for all new banks established after 1992.
Pursuant to the "Designated Task Assignment Guidelines of Bank ex-
amination," the Ministry of Finance established the "Financial Examination
Business Review Committee," which is in charge of communications and
coordination of bank supervision operations. In order to improve the effi-
ciency of supervision and human resources, the committee also arranged to
exchange the audit reports produced by the three supervisory agencies.
Nevertheless, this multi-agency supervisory framework inhibits the
ability of the government to cope quickly and efficiently with financial
problems. Thus, reform should clearly delineate the responsibilities of each
agency. Learning from the experience of British financial supervision re-
form, 112 consolidation of Taiwan's current multiple supervision system as a
and operated by the Director General of Postal Remittances and Savings Banks. See Minis-
try of Finance, Statistics on Number of Domestic Financial Institutions on Taiwan (1998).
109Taiwan Banking Law, art. 19 (1995), as amended 1995 ruling that the Ministry of Fi-
nance is responsible for all new banks established after 1992.
'10Central Bank of China Act [hereinafter the CBCA] art. 38 (guiding the Central Bank
of China to undertake the supervision of the operation of all financial institutions in coordi-
nation with the Ministry of Finance). The Central Bank of China is responsible for the older
banks, those established before 1992. The CBCA was enacted on May 23, 1935, and
amended in 1979 and 1997. Art. 38 of the CBCA, as amended in 1979
11 See Deposit Insurance Act ("DIA"), art.21, supra note 72. Pursuant to Article 21 of
the Deposit Insurance Act and the "Designated Task Assignment Guidelines Of Bank Ex-
amination" promulgated by the cabinet, the CDIC shall examine the insured financial insti-
tutions, provide them with formal recommendations for improvement, and assist them in
running sound businesses.
"2 In response to the trend of financial diversity, most industrial countries, such as the
United States, Japan, and England, proposed to centralize current multi-agency financial su-
pervision. For example, in 1999, England organized the Financial Services Authority
[hereinafter FSA] which has clear responsibilities and a close relationship with the Bank of
England and the Treasury. In addition to banking supervisors, the FSA also encompasses the
regulators of securities, investment management, personal investment products, building so-
cieties (Britain's savings and loan industry), and insurers. The purpose of creating the FSA,
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single regulatory supervisory agency will empower Taiwan financial
authority with comprehensive power to monitor financial services.' 13
By creating a single financial supervisory agency, Taiwan would
eliminate conflicting supervisory regulations and comply with the standards
of the Basle Accords. Amendments to the current financial supervisory
scheme will require the development of new regulations and the coopera-
tion of several related agencies. Further, collaboration will be necessary to
avoid the costly process of modifying each agency's rules.
Financial liberalization also fuels Taiwan to reform obsolete banking
regulations. Through a 1989 amendment to the Banking Law, Taiwan
granted licenses to sixteen new private banks.11 4 To facilitate open-market
competition, Taiwan amended its Constitution to privatize government-
owned banks on July 21, 1997." s In January 1998, the Taiwan provincial
government's "big three" commercial banks, First Commercial Bank, Hua
Nan Commercial Bank, and Chang Ewa Commercial Bank, were privatized
along with several other state-owned banks." 6 The privatization of state-
run banks increases their efficiency, competition, and customer response.
Taiwan plans to promote Taipei as a regional financial center by
pressing ahead with the liberalization effort and by improving the financial
system.' 7 Taiwan's strategy for becoming a regional financial center in-
cludes keeping the off-shore and on-shore markets separate. Off-shore
markets enjoy full liberalization, while on-shore or domestic markets will
effective in the middle of 1998, is to ensure stability, avoid duplication, and enhance Eng-
land's banking competitiveness. See Howard Davies, A Policeman's Lot is not a National
One, in THE WORLD IN 1998 122 (Economist ed. 1997).
113Taiwan drafted legislation which simplified multi-agency responsibilities to
strengthen banking supervision. Once the drafted legislation is approved by the legislative
Yuan (Taiwan's equivalency of the US Congress), the CDIC will compel supervision of the
management of financial institutions. This draft legislation raises the penalties to banks who
are negligent in monitoring internal control. See Laura Tyson, Growing Demands for Di-
verse Products, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at surv. III.
114 See Taiwan: New Banks Urged to Exercise Self-Discipline, China Eco. News Service,
July 8, 1993 (available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, TAIWAN File).
"'on July 18, 1997, Taiwan's third National Assembly at its 32nd plenary session
passed the fourth amendment to the Constitution, which was promulgated by Taiwan's
president on July 21, 1997, and took effect immediately. See Nichael Y.M. Kau, Crafting
Constitutional Reform under President Lee Teng-hui, FREE CHINA J., Aug. 23, 1997. The
amended Constitution starts the privatization of state-owned banks. See Constitutional Re-
form: Adjusting the System, FREE CHINA REV. Oct. 1997, at 49.
116The three banks together accounted for twenty percent of total domestic deposits and
18.4 percent of total domestic loans by the end of 1996. In addition to these three banks, the
other Taiwan provincial banks also include the Taiwan Business Bank, the Bank of Taiwan,
the Land Bank of Taiwan, and the Taiwan Cooperative Bank. See United World Chinese
Commercial Bank, Major Economic Indicators on Taiwan, R.O.C., Oct. 20, 1999, at 76-79.
17 See Lawrence S. Liu, supra note 89 at 78-79.
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gradually liberalize.18 The separation of off-shore and on-shore banking
systems reflects Taiwan's conservative policy of protecting the domestic
banking system from the negative effects of off-shore volatility, such as the
high fluctuation in interest rates, systemic risk, and exchange rates.
In addition, Taiwan has made systematic regulatory efforts to modern-
ize its financial sector. These changes, however, are merely the beginning
of what is needed. Taiwan still faces many challenges to achieve financial
liberalization. 119 These challenges include the need to implement better
regulations, supervision, capital and foreign exchange controls, market ac-
cess, and national treatment of foreign investors and financial institutions.
20
In connection with increasing financial globalization, Taiwan should
focus on preventing rather than responding to financial collapses by im-
proving the supervision of banking activities. Adoption of international fi-
nancial supervisory standards is likely to provide Taiwan with an
international level of financial supervision. Taiwan's Banking Law already
requires that the risk-based capital ratios of a bank be no less than eight per-
cent, as recommended by the Basle Accord on the International Conver-
gence of Capital Measurement to Capital Standards.
Further adoption of the Basle Accords by the Taiwanese government in
the banking sector would be a significant step toward establishing Taipei as
a financial center. One popular method for improving the supervision of
complicated financial institutions is to create a single agency to monitor fi-
nancial services. 122 The concept of the Basle Accords corresponds to Tai-
118See Ya-Huei, Legal Aspects of Off-Shore Banking in Taiwan, 8 MD. J. INT'L L.&
TRADE. 237, 238 (1984) (noting that establishing an off-shore banking system could attract
foreign banks and achieve the goal of becoming a financial center with low cost and risk to
Taiwan's domestic financial system).
"9 For example, in 1995, problems at a major credit cooperative, a leading commercial
paper financing company, and several agricultural cooperatives exacerbated weaknesses in
the Taiwanese banking system. These financial scandals partially accounted for a twenty-
seven percent decline in the stock market in 1995 and highlighted the need for Taiwan to re-
vamp its system for the oversight of financial institutions. See Recent Developments in
Banking and Finance in the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services., 104 Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1996).
120 See Liang, supra note 81, at 117, 131.
121 Taiwan's Banking Law, art. 44.
12The establishment of a single, integrated regulator for financial services has become
the norm in many advanced countries around the world. For example, under the pressure of
a developing financial conglomerate which combined banking, securities, insurance, and
non-financial business, Britain designed the Financial Service Authority [hereinafter FSA] to
merge nine financial regulatory bodies into one effective on October 28, 1997. These nine
financial agencies were the Securities and Investment Board, the Personal Investment
Authority, the Investment Management Regulatory Organization, the Securities and Futures
Authority, the Supervision and Surveillance Division of the Bank of England, the Building
Societies Commission, the Insurance Directorate of the Department of Trade and Industry,
the Friendly Societies Commission, and the Registrar of Friendly Societies. See Clive Bri-
ault, The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator, (Financial Services
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wan's requirements which avoid banking fraud, money laundering, and
frame a sound and safe baking system with compliance ensured by banking
supervision.'
B. Securities: The Demand for Efficient Policing and Alleviation of
Government Interference
Taiwan's securities market is one of the most active securities markets
in the world. Economic growth and financial deregulation fuel the contin-
ued growth of Taiwan's securities market. The Taiwan Stock Exchange
("TSE") began operating in 1962 and is governed by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") under the supervision of the Ministry of Fi-
nance. 124  In addition, the Over-the-Counter markets ("OTC") were
operated by securities brokers and traders before the establishment of the
TSE in 1962. Because the number of traded companies and the level of
transactions were minimal in the OTC, Taiwan prohibited OTC transactions
until the end of 1989. The reopening of the OTC did not become an in-
vesting target of investors until 1995, when the Ministry of Finance re-
structured the OTC to conform with market liberalization.
Stocks traded on the TSE market are divided into three categories
based on the listed companies' paid-in capital. Category "A" includes
companies with a minimum paid-in capital of 600 million New Taiwan
dollars. 125 Category "B" includes corporations with a paid-in capital of 300
to 600 million New Taiwan dollars. Category "C" includes high-tech busi-
nesses and companies with a paid-in capital of 200 million to 300 million
New Taiwan dollars. The criteria for inclusion in each category also in-
clude duration of incorporation, minimum level of profitability, and diversi-
fication of shareholding requirements with descending stringency.
Following international standards, Taiwan allows foreign investors to
invest in the TSE through indirect investment, direct investment by quali-
Authortiy) May 1999. The FSA will eliminate disputes about responsibilities between regu-
lators and results in simpler regulation for Britain's financial industry. See Global Survey,
supra note 20, at 169.
123 See Michael Blanden, Can the Risks be Seen?, THE BANKER, May 1997, at 35.
124In addition, establishing the Taiwan Stock Exchange was part of Taiwan's land reform
program, which re-allocated land by giving former landowners government securities as
compensation for land transferred to tenant farmers. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Banking and
Finance in Taiwan: The Prospects for Internationalization in the 1990s, 25 INT'L LAW. 907,
915 (1991).
'2As of November 17, 1999, the currency exchange rate is NT$ 31.70 to US$1. See
Emerging-Market Indicators, Tim ECONOMIST, July 29, 1999, at 100.
In Taiwan, the currency rate of the US dollar against the NT dollar is based on the daily
basis of the weighted average of inter-bank transaction rates on the previous business day.
Daily adjustment of the currency rate is limited to 2.25 percent of the central rate on the pre-
vious business day.
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fled foreign institutional investors, 126 and direct investment by all foreign
investors. Unless otherwise specified by regulation or law, the scope of
foreign investment is not limited. At the end of 1996, Taiwan listed 382
companies on the TSE.127 The TSE has a large margin for growth because
most Taiwanese firms currently raise capital through bank loans. There-
fore, shifting from rigid bank-loan financing to more freely and more acces-
sible stock-based financing will likely result in phenomenal growth for the
TSE.
To enlarge Taiwan's stock market, Taiwan has made a number of ad-
justments. For example, in 1988, Taiwan first allowed new domestic secu-
rities firms to do business in the TSE. By 1995, Taiwan had restructured
the over-the-counter stock market and permitted foreign securities firms to
access the market. These changes led to an influx of capital which enlarged
Taiwan's securities market.1 28 To prevent potential and uncertain dramatic
fluctuations, daily changes in TSE share prices are capped at plus or minus
seven percent.
Before the Securities Exchange Law ("SEL") was amended in 1988,
securities firms were classified as underwriters, brokers, or dealers.12 9 Each
securities firm was limited exclusively to one approved function. As of
1988, Taiwan had only twenty-two underwriters (only five or six of whom
were active), ten dealers, and twenty-eight brokers (fourteen brokers were
private companies and the other fourteen were state-owned trust or savings
departments of financial institutions).
Since many securities firms were inactive due to the small number of
listed companies and inadequate depth in the market until the mid-1980s,
the securities business in Taiwan was unprofitable before 1980. Trading
increased in Taiwan's equities between 1986 and 1989, funded by under-
ground investment companies ("UIICs").1 30 Due to the limited investment
126 Subject to the Regulations for Investments in Securities by Overseas and Foreign Na-
tional [hereinafter QFII Regulations], Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors [hereinafter
QUII] are defined as banks, insurance companies, fund management institutions, securities
firms, brokerages, and other institutional investors, which meet the qualifications set by the
SEC.
127See THE CENTRAL BANK OF CHINA, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 105 (1996) (reporting ac-
cording to TSE statistics, as of the end of 1996, a total 382 listed companies, an increase of
thirty-five companies over the number in 1995. The total booking capital in 1996 amounted
to NT$1,661.3 billion, an increase of 23.4 percent over 1995).
128 See Dennis Engbarth, Heat for the New Kids, THE BANKER, Feb. 1997, at 55.
129Taiwan's Securities and Exchange Law [hereinafter Taiwan's SEL] was promulgated
on April 30, 1968. Taiwan's SEL has been enacted five times, on November 13, 1968, May
11, 1981, May 11, 1983, January 29, 1988, and May 7, 1997. Taiwan's SEL consists of
eight chapters and 183 articles that primarily govem the securities market, maintain securi-
ties market order, promulgates the scope of official duties delegated to the Securities and
Futures Commission.
130The UICs rose to prominence in 1986 and 1987, creating major economic and finan-
cial problems for Taiwanese authorities and investors. The UICs mushroomed to colossal
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channels under Taiwan's conservative policies, the UICs, which are unli-
censed, non-banking financial institutions, received large deposits from
Taiwanese investors, who in turn received interest rates ten to twenty-five
percent higher than those of banks. The UICs manipulated stock prices, by
investing in specific companies' shares and illegal insider trading, to pay
off high short-term interest rates to its investors.' The UICs threaten Tai-
wan's financial system and cause a loss of confidence in the government.
Additionally, the bankruptcy of a number of UICs in 1987 caused a finan-
cial crisis from which investors could not recover lost capital. The market
crash and defaults on loan payments prevented other companies from rais-
ing capital.
The UICs scandals pushed open Taiwanese investing channels by
catalyzing the amendment of financial regulations. Taiwan amended the
Banking Law in 1989 to punish illegal financial institutions with criminal
penalties and to grant licenses to new private banks. In addition, the 1988
SEL amendment also removed the barrier to entry which had been in force
since 1949. The number of newly established securities firms in the Taiwan
securities market exploded. By the end of 1991, 332 new firms had ap-
peared in Taiwan, of which forty-five were integrated securities houses, r32
and 287 were brokerages.
To accomplish the long-term goal of a sound securities market, Taiwan
should efficiently distribute information to investors and prohibit the use of
borrowed-name accounts 133 to solidify the TSE. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission has not clearly defined insider trading and market ma-
nipulation. Vague regulations create inconsistent viewpoints and have
caused the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Ministry of Justice
to reach different definitions of insider trading. In addition, the divergent
views of the two agencies give investors no guidance, and thus created a le-
gal loophole for the enforcement of the Securities Exchange Law. In order
to avoid limiting majority shareholders' responsibilities regulated by the
SEL, 34 it is necessary to eliminate the widespread use of borrowed-name
accounts which hinders effective implementation of the SEL and effective
collection of capital gains taxes caused by this deception.
proportions within only a few years by offering returns to investors of four percent or more
per month. For example, Hung Yuan, the largest UIC, together with 170 small UICs, was
estimated to have taken the equivalent of US $8 billion from more than a million investors in
Taiwan. See James McGregor, Fate of a Gray-Market Behemoth in Taiwan Could Cause
Financial and Political Tremors, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY, Nov. 20,. 1989, at 1.
131id.
112Art. 22 of Taiwan's SEL, supra note 130 (allowing securities firms to engage in a
complete range of securities business).
133 Borrowed-name accounts are securities accounts opened in the name of a real person,
but controlled and owned by another person or entity.
134Art. 22(2) of Taiwan's SEL, supra note 129, (requiring a report or approval once
shareholders, who own more than ten percent of a company, transfer their stock shares).
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The lack of efficient oversight contributes to instability in the securities
market of Taiwan. Since one-third of Taiwan's population invests in the
TSE and because the market overreacts to political events, Taiwan's gov-
ernment should endeavor to create a stable stock market in order to avoid
adverse political implications. Without a competent regulatory system to
govern securities markets, the Taiwanese stock market is like a casino with
its lax disclosure regulations, insider trading, and the use of borrowed-name
accounts. As a consequence, Taiwan needs market discipline to establish
an efficient market-oriented system for its securities markets. 35
IV. CHINA: BURGEONING FINANCIAL SERVICES DEVELOPMENT
China's financial system plays a role in supporting open-economic de-
velopment. China's banking sector is contributing to China's ongoing eco-
nomic development by switching from state-owned policy banks 1 6 to state-
owned commercial banks.137 Separating state banks from state-controlled
commercial banks is the most immediate and important task for China in
regard to banking reform. 138 Since many state-owned enterprises are ineffi-
cient, state-owned banks endure inordinate amounts of bad debt. To resolve
its bad debt problem, China is considering financing state-owned enter-
prises through the securities market rather than via banking loans.1 39 In ad-
dition to spreading the risk, raising funds from the securities market will put
Chinese state-owned enterprises in a better position to face market compe-
tition.
After seven years of the legislative drafting process, on December 29,
1998 China enacted the Securities Law on the national level, which became
effective on July 1, 1999. 4° The Securities Law terminated the divergence
in domestic securities regulations and accorded with the expectations of
135 See Jeffrey H. Chen & Jack J. T. Huang, Taiwan's Evolving Stock Market: Policy and
Regulatory Trends, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 35, 36-37 (1993).
136 A Chinese state-owned policy bank refers to a state-owned bank which, unlike a
commercial bank, prioritizes and reflects government policy. See WORLD BANK, CHINA:
FINANCIAL SECTOR POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 9 (1990).
137 See Haiqun Yang, BANKING AND FINANCIAL CONTROL IN REFORMING PLANNED
ECONOMIES 77 (1997).
1
38 See Tony Walker, Chinese Growth 'under Threat,' FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at P.6.
139 See James Harding, China Moves Towards Allowing Mutual Funds, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
10, 1997, at 6 (stating that China approved regulations for establishing mutual investment
funds which is the first step to establish a second capital market).
4'The People's Republic of China Securities Law [hereinafter China's Securities Law]
was promulgated on December 29, 1998 and came into enforce on July 1, 1999. See The
People's Republic of China Securities Law, CHINA LAW PRACTICE, Feb. 1999, at 25-66.
China's Securities Law comprises 214 articles grouped under twelve chapters, dealing with a
wide variety of matters including the issuance of securities, trading of securities, takeover of
listed companies, stock exchange, securities firms, securities intermediaries and regulatory
authorities.
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domestic and foreign investors. The amendment of China's securities law
may enable China to create efficient securities markets. To further reform
the financial system, one proposal for China's securities market is to con-
solidate the classification of shares and unification of securities issues.
Consequently, in order to participate in this internationalization and join the
WTO, China must increasingly liberalize and apply the rule of law on its fi-
nancial system.
14 1
A. Banking: A Crucial Aspect of China's Ongoing Economic Reform
As early as 1978, China implemented market-oriented reforms for its
banking system. 42 In spite of passing laws to improve banking supervision,
such as the Central Banking Law,143 the Chinese banking supervision sys-
tem remains underdeveloped and disorganized. The primary risks to the
pursuit of China's banking reforms are the continued burdens of state-
enterprise debt, rising unemployment, and a weakening of the government's
fiscal position.144
China's state-owned banking system has numerous problems. Its pri-
mary drawbacks are insufficient capital reserves, and a misallocation of
credit. 4  For example, normal international standards require minimum
capital reserves of eight percent.146 China's banks are not even close to
meeting these minimum international standards. 147  In addition,
misallocation of credit is common because all of China's banks are state-
controlled, which forces many banks are forced to offer loans to unproduc-
tive state-enterprises rather than to the private sector. Political interference
and mismanagement are also common in China's banking system. 14
China's politicians manipulate banks for quasi-political reasons; spe-
cifically, to sustain non-profit state-owned enterprises and prevent further
141 See Beiing's Blueprint for Reform, FIN. TIMES. Nov. 13, 1995, at 21 (reporting
China's plans to make its currency convertible in accordance with the requirement for the
entry into the WTO).
1
42 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE [hereinafter GAO],
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING U.S. BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES IN CHINA 19 (May 1994).
143 See Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Transforming China's Traditional Banking Systems under
The New National Banking Laws, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 479 (1996).
'44See WORLD BANK, supra note 136, at 70-79.
145 See Gary Klintworth, China's State Owned Enterprises, in PRC POLITICAL ECONOMY:
PROSPECTS UNDER JIANG ZEMIN 73, 76 (Hsin-hsing We eds. 1999).
1
46
See BASLE COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT
AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 16 (July 1988) (suggesting that a minimum standard of capital of
international bank to weighted risk assets should be set at eight percent).
14 7 See Tokley & Ravn, supra note 49, at 86.
14 See David Eu, Note, Financial Reforms and Corporate Governance in China, 34
COLUMBIA J. TRAN. L. 469,484 (1996).
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unemployment. 49  Under constant political pressure, China's banking
authorities focus on political factors instead of credit analysis in making
lending decisions.'5s Inefficient operation of and frequent losses by China's
state-owned enterprises exacerbate this problem. Loans to inefficient gov-
ernmental enterprises indirectly burden China's banking system, as banks
are forced to accept a large number of bad loans.
15 1
These bad loans have required China to proceed with a series of bank-
ing reforms. From 1994 to 1995, China's solution for uncollectable debt
was to create three new "policy banks" whose purpose was to attempt to
establish commercial banks in China. 52 China transferred policy-lending
operations to the three newly created policy banks: the State Development
Bank of China, the Agricultural Development Bank, and the Import/Export
Bank of China.
These new policy banks allowed the four commercial banks 53 to take
on normal commercial functions upon the release of the bad debt owed by
state-owned enterprises, and learning to apply commercial criteria to lend-
ing practices. China wanted the new policy banks to be the sole policy-
based lenders, thereby relieving the commercial banks of this responsibility.
Subsequently, China's banking authorities have made numerous efforts
to reform both the state and commercial banking sectors. China enacted the
Law of the People's Bank of China ("Central Banking Law") on March 18,
1995,54 which increased the authority and responsibilities of the People's
Bank of China ("PBOC"), as a central bank.' 5 The PBOC was the only
149 A banking failure, in political terms, may encourage the government to bail out rather
than sell or liquidate a bank. Further, a substantial number of countries involve the courts in
the decision to close a bank or in the disposition of the assets of a failed bank. The resulting
delays are frequently counter-productive and may result in the authorities' unwillingness to
close an insolvent bank, which will either continue to operate and provide hampered compe-
tition or will be later rescued, detracting from market discipline under either scenario. Given
the lending relationship and general dependence between state-owned enterprise and state-
owned banks in China, a banking failure would have drastic social, political, and economic
effects. See George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulations, 16
CATO J. 17, 19 (Spring/Summer 1996).
15 0 See Dinosaurs Lumbering towards the Real World, ASIAMoNEY, Dec. 1997/Jan. 1998,
at 20.
15 1 See Xin, supra note 51, at 36.
152See Dinosaurs Lumbering towards the Real World, supra note 150.
153 China's banking system is dominated by the four major commercial banks: the Bank
of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Agriculture Bank of China, and
the 'People's Construction Bank of China. See D. K. Srivastava & Wang Chenguang, The
Role of the Central Bank of China, in LEGAL DEvELOPMENTs IN CHINA: MARKET ECONOMY
AND LAW, 217,225 (Wang Guiguo & Wei Zhenying eds. 1996).
154The Law of the People's Bank of China [hereinafter China's Central Banking Law],
promulgated on March 18, 1995, has eight chapters, fifty-one articles, and was adopted by
the Third Session of the Eighth National People's Congress.
155Founded in December 1948 on the eve of the establishment of the government of the
People's Republic of China, the People's Bank of China had been a government agency un-
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bank in China to perform the myriad functions of a quasi-central bank, a
commercial bank, and a merchant bank until the establishment of the spe-
cial banks in January 1986.
The People's Bank of China has three major responsibilities: making
and implementing national monetary policies; supervising and administrat-
ing financial institutions; and maintaining the stability of the official cur-
rency. 156 In order to govern commercial banking activities, China passed
the Commercial Banking Law 57 on July 1, 1995, which sets standards for
evaluating and granting loans.
The enactment of China's Central Banking Law and Commercial
Banking Law has moved China closer to meeting the international banking
and financial standards. However, the Central Banking Law fails to iden-
tify the agencies responsible for enforcement. 58 China also needs additional
provisions to enhance the implementation of banking supervision. Finally,
the susceptibility of China's banking industry to political and governmental
interference 159 requires the establishment of an efficient and independent
banking system.
Such a system could be achieved through the adoption of the Basle
Accords. As the Basle Accords are soft laws of international banking su-
pervision standards, application of the Basle Accords into China's system
of banking regulation will allow China to adopt internationally recognized
standards. In turn, the adoption of the Basle Accords will entice foreign
banks to conduct business in China.
With its recent economic growth, China's financial system appears di-
versified. China has non-banking financial institutions such as rural credit
cooperatives and trust and investment companies ("TIC"). TICs provide
der the state Council. Its main responsibilities were stabilizing the value of renminbi
(China's official currency) and attracting and allocating funds for "socialist construction."
See Liu Hongru, Developments in the Reform of China's Banking and Financial Systems, 2
J. C~MNEsE L. 323, 326 (1988).
156 See China's Central Banking Law, art 4.
157China's Commercial Banking Law [hereinafter China's Banking Law] was adopted at
the 13th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress on May
10, 1995 and became effective as of July 1, 1995. China's Commercial Banking Law has
nine chapters and ninety-one articles, and clarifies the role of commercial banks in China.
Additionally, China's Commercial Banking Law standardizes the commercial behavior of
the banks.
158PBOC will Enforce Its Supervision over the Non-Bank Financial Institutions, WORLD
J., May 3, 1995, at B15 (noting that the People's Bank of China plans to issue rules in the
next two or three years regarding insurance, securities, lottery and investment funds).
159See Henry Sender, Black-Box Bankers, FAR E. Eco. REv., Feb. 9, 1995, at 48-49
(noting the strange phenomenon in China that central banking is little known and aspires to
obscurity rather than prominence).
"6°Trust and investment companies primarily undertake deposit-taking and the provision
of guarantee or letter of credit; investment in industrial companies; brokerage activities; and
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credit and service to customers in rural areas where banks are reluctant to
enter. Most TICs are affiliated with banks or closely linked to local gov-
ernments. TICs provide China's economy with valuable flexibility in areas
of new financial growth.
However, the Commercial Banking Law's separation of banking and
non-banking activities decreases the TIC's value in China's financial sys-
tem. 1 61 Moreover, TIC's high risks and reduced macroeconomic control
pose a challenge to changing the character of China's financial system. 162
As a result, the merger of the TIC into the local banking system will be an
appropriate method in accordance with the Commercial Banking Law.
China's banking reform was structured to prevent banking failure and
to increase the competitiveness of China's banks against foreign banks,
which are increasingly present in China. China's banking reform is likely
to benefit from China's ongoing need for economic development. 63 In re-
viewing China's banking reforms, establishing agencies responsible for
banking supervision can prevent banking failures. After becoming a WTO
member, China's implementation of its promise for additional openness
will allow more foreign institutions into China's market. This banking re-
form through comprehensive banking supervisory regulations also can in-
crease China's banks' competitiveness with foreign banks.
B. Securities: Demanding Enhancement to Unify Securities Activities
China's securities market is an emerging market and needs enhance-
ment and transparency in its securities regulations. China's securities mar-
ket started in two cities in the 1990s, Shanghai and Shenzhen.164 After
being closed since 1949, the Shanghai Securities Exchange re-opened on
December 19, 1990, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange reopened on July 3,
1991.'65 By the end of 1991, the total value of stocks approved by the state
and publicly issued in Shanghai and Shenzhen had reached 3.3 billion ren-
securities dealing and underwriting. See Anjali Kumar et al., WORLD BANK, CHINA'S NON-
BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, TRUST AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES 6 (1997).161 Art. 43 II of China's Commercial Banking Law prohibits commercial banks from in-
vesting in non-banking financial institutions or enterprises within the People's Republic of
China. The State Council shall formulate separate implementation procedures for commer-
cial banks which invest in non-banking financial institutions or enterprises prior to the im-
plementation of the [commercial banking] law.
162See KUMAR, supra note 160, at 19.
163 See China's Reforms, FIN. TIMES, March 1998, at 19 (analyzing China's need to re-
form its banking system to avoid bankruptcy caused by bad loans).
164 Mei Xia et al., THE RE-EMERGING SECURITIES MARKET IN CHINA 103 (1992).
1651For an overview of the history and development of China's stock market, see Benja-
min R. Tarbutton, China--A National Regulatory Framework for the PRCs Stock Markets
Begins to Emerge, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. 411, 412 (1994).
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minbi (equivalent to 412 million U.S. dollars), of which 84.8 percent were
public stocks and 15.1 percent were individual stocks. 66
Prior to July 1, 1999, during the time before the Securities Law passed
on December 29, 1998, local rather than national securities regulations gov-
erned both securities markets. In addition to these two officially recognized
exchanges, China has also instituted "securities exchange centers" in eight-
een of China's larger cities as well as two electronic trading systems, the
National Electronic Trading system and the Securities Trading Automated
Quotation system.
In cooperation with the People's Bank of China,16 7 Shanghai and
Shenzhen's municipal governments promulgated China's securities regula-
tions. 168 Both the Provisional Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Ad-
ministration of the Trading of Securities 69 and the Provisional Measures of
Shenzhen Municipality for Administration of the Issue and Trading of
Shares170 demonstrated a distinctly regional attitude. Due to inconsistent
local administrative orders and guidance, however, China's capital markets
often present low liquidity, and high volatility.'7 1 In addition, agencies with
over-lapping and ill-defined responsibilities make the regulatory process
unclear.
As a result, China needs comprehensive securities regulations to pro-
vide adequate shareholder protection and promote the internationalization
of China's securities market. For this reason, in 1992, the State Council or-
ganized the State Council Securities Regulatory Commission and China Se-
curities Regulatory Commission to develop China's national securities
regulations and regulators.'
72
'16See Hassanali Mehran et al., MONETARY AND EXCHANGE SYSTEM REFORM IN CHINA:
AN EXPERIMENT IN GRADUALISM 32-33 (1996).
'67Under Article 4 of the China's Central Banking Law, the People's Bank of China has
authority to regulate stock, bonds, and negotiable instruments, and to administer China's fi-
nancial markets. See Huang, supra note 51, at 18.
16SThe regulation promulgated by the municipal governments of Shanghai and Shenzhen
include provisions governing stock registration, disclosure, trading, insider information, bro-
ker dealers, and administration of the stock exchanges. See Xia, supra note 164, at 112.
'69On November 27, 1990, the Shanghai Municipality promulgated the Provisional
Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration of the Trading of Securities. Id. at
113.
'70On May 15, 1991, the City Government of Shenzhen declared the Provisional Meas-
ures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration of the Trading of Securities. Id. at 115.
171 In 1993 and 1994, China's market for "A" shares has remained volatile. Shanghai's
"A" share index tumbled twenty percent in September and early October 1994, with analysts
attributing the fall to profit-taking and concerns about rising inflation. Shanghai's "A" share
index fell to a low of 328.85 at the end of July 1994.
172Since 1993, China drafted the Securities Law and proposed the China Securities
Regulatory Commission to supervise the trading activities of securities firms. See Lay Hong
Tan, The Legal and Regulatory Framework of Securities Markets in the PRC, 7 ASIA
PACIFIC L. REv. 69, 79 (1999).
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China's equity market has grown rapidly since re-opening with eighty-
nine listed enterprises in 1990-1991.'73 At the end of September 1997, a
total of 708 enterprises were listed on China's securities market.' 74 Over
US$159.7 billion in equity shares were available for trading. 7s The listed
companies had a paid-in capital of 164 billion renminbi equivalent to
twenty-four percent of China's GDP.
176
The Chinese economic reform, which began in December 1979,177 cre-
ated an urgent need to build China's capital market.178 Low capital re-
quirements to invest in industry and infrastructure construction are
indications of the limited financial resources of the State. Both private and
state-owned enterprises in China suffer from a deficiency of capital. As a
result of an unbalanced allocation of capital, private sector entities rarely
borrow from state-owned banks.
179
Since state-owned enterprises receive subsidies from the government,
they have very few incentives for efficiency and profitability. By estab-
lishing a stock exchange system, China could change the corporate structure
of state-owned enterprises and create market competition, improve capital
deficiency, and improve the allocation of capital.'80
A top priority for China's securities authorities is the simplification of
stock categories based on the principle of "same share, same right." Under
the present securities regulatory system, stocks are divided into three cate-
gories: state shares, legal-person shares, and individual shares 181 In addi-
tion, these shares are further classified depending on corporate ownership
and the nature of the listing and the issuing places.
182
173On December 9, 1990, the Shanghai Stock Exchange was established; and on July 3,
1991, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established. By the end of 1991, the total value of
stocks approved by the state and publicly issued in Shanghai and Shenzhen had reached 3.3
billion renmibi (equivalent to 412 million U.S. dollars), of which 84.8 percent were public
stocks and 15.1 percent were individual stocks. See MEHRAN, supra note 166.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176See Sleight of Hand, THE ECONOMIsT, Mar. 7, 1998, at 78 (indicating that the some
estimates was as high as seventy percent).
177China began its remarkable economic reform starting in 1979 by welcoming foreign
capital and technology to promote China's economic development. See Standly B.
Lubnman, Investment and Export Contracts in the People's Republic of China: Perspectives
of Evolving Pattern, BRIGHAM YOUNG U.L.REv. 543, 544-45 (1988)
178See Capital Markets, CHINA'S Top 2000, 1998, at 140.
179 In 1996, nearly one-third of large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises were un-
profitable and survived on government subsides. In 1993, China spent $3.5 billion to subsi-
dize inefficient state-owned enterprises, an amount equal to 150 percent of the central
government's total budget deficit. The subsidies were the main force driving inflation in
China's economy.
80See WORLD BANK, supra note 136.
181See MEHRAN, supra note 166, at 33.
18 2See Tokley & Ravn, supra note 49, at 71.
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China divides stock shares into six categories."' "N' shares are issued
by Chinese companies exclusively to Chinese individuals and Chinese legal
persons.1 14 "B" shares are issued by Chinese companies and sold exclu-
sively to non-Chinese persons or foreign legal entities.185 "B" shares are
denominated in renminbi, but must be purchased with foreign currency.
86
In addition to the two major categories of shares ("A" and "B"), "C" shares
are issued to legal-persons, such as enterprises that hold shares in another
enterprise.' 87 "H" shares, also known as "red chip" shares, are stocks of
China's state-owned companies issued are traded in Hong Kong.'88 "N"
shares are American Depository Receipts are traded on the New York Stock
Exchange. 189 Also, "L" shares are listed on the London Stock Exchange as
of October 7, 1996.
Generally, individual "A" and "B" shares are traded in the domestic
stock markets in large volumes. Both "A" and "B" shares are traded in the
two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen.190 As of June 1998, 890
"A" shares were registered (456 in Shanghai and 434 in Shenzhen). 9 ' Only
a total of 104 "B" shares were listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen during the
same period. The smaller amount of "B" shares demonstrates the limited
opportunities for foreign portfolio equity investment in China compared to
the opportunities for domestic investors. In addition, a small volume of "C"
shares, known as legal person shares, were created to designated holdings in
State enterprises by official bodies which were traded within domestic mar-
kets. 92
"H" and 'N"' shares have opened a new channel of fund-raising for
China's big companies. 193 By listing and issuing shares overseas, China's




881In July 1993, China's government permitted nine state-owned enterprises to issue and
list their shares on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong [hereinafter SEHK]. These shares are
known as "H" shares or "red chips." The first issuing group issued 5.6 billion shares, raising
total funds of over 11.56 billion Hong Kong dollars. In September 1996, thirty-one of
China's state-owned enterprises have listed H shares on the SEHK. See Nicholas R. Lardy,
CHINA'S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 153-4 (1998).
1891n September 1994, Shongdong Huaneng Energy International began offering "N"
shares, also know as American Depository Receipts, on the New York Stock Exchange. Id.
'9°See Li Kui-Wai, FINANCIAL REPRESSION AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 85 (1994);
Xia, supra note 164, at 103-16.
'91 See A Growing Stock Market in China, CHINA DAILY, July 7, 1998.
192 See Tan, supra note 172, at 70.
193 See Lay Hong Tan, Capitalism in the People's Republic of China? A Survey of the Re-
emerging Securities and Financial Markets, 16 COMPANY LAWYER 72, 79 (1996) (mention-
ing that one of the reasons commonly offered for the poor performance of "B" shares is the
competition from issuing the "N" and "H" shares).
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state-owned companies can raise capital and restructure in accordance with
international corporate standards, regulated by the US, UK, and Hong
Kong. These reforms set an example for China's overall corporate restruc-
turing.
194
Increased participation in China's stock markets requires adjustments
in the shareholding system to provide investors with additional investment
information. For example, China should broaden the structure of share-
holding to encourage individual investment and decrease the presence of
shareholding companies. A general lack of regulation and an indifference
towards the purposes of current regulation cause further instability in the
securities market. In addition, the different regulations of the Shanghai and
Shenzhen markets create confusion. Thus, to remedy these problems,
China needs national securities regulations to prevent market manipulation
and to create a disciplined framework.
V. HONG KONG: HOPE FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS AFTER THE TRANSITION
TO CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY
With Hong Kong's "hand-over" to China, the future of Hong Kong's
economic development will depend on the continuing progress of Hong
Kong's financial system. Compared with the banking systems in Taiwan
and China, Hong Kong has a liberal international banking system that was
previously overseen by the British government. 195 At the end of February
1997, Hong Kong granted licenses to 61 restricted banks and 123 deposit-
taking companies, which was comprised of 366 authorized institutions. 96
Thirty foreign countries established banks and placed 333 authorized insti-
tutions and 159 representative offices in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong is an enormous player in the international securities mar-
ket. For example, the "Asian Flu," which started in Hong Kong, indicates
the increasing international importance of the Hong Kong securities mar-
194id"
195See generally Elizabeth A. R. Yee, Hong Kong and China in 1997: An Examination of
Possible Legal and Economic Implications for United States Business, 36 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 595 n.1 (1996) (discussing the idea that Hong Kong may be the best example of free
trade).
196Hong Kong maintains a three-tier system of deposit-taking institutions, comprised of
licensed banks, restricted license banks, and deposit-taking companies. They are collectively
known as authorized institutions. Only licensed banks may operate savings accounts, and
accept deposits of any size and maturity. Restricted license banks are only permitted to ac-
cept deposits of HK$500,000 or more, while deposit-taking companies are only permitted to
accept a minimum deposits of HK$100,000 with an original maturity of not less than three
months. Restricted license banks and deposit-taking companies are two categories of insti-
tutions which provide an opportunity for overseas banks not qualified for a full banking li-
cense to set up establishments in Hong Kong and conduct wholesale and investment banking
business. See Berry F. C. Hsu, Laws of Banking and Finance in the Hong Kong SAR 175-78
(1998).
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ket.197 To promote stability, China should strengthen its relationship with
Hong Kong. By supporting Hong Kong, China would establish confidence
in Hong Kong's securities market and insulate itself against further finan-
cial crises.
Under the Basic Law policy of "One country, Two systems,"'198 Hong
Kong's people should enjoy a high degree of autonomy. With the change
from British to Chinese rule, however, Hong Kong may have to alter its
existing financial system. The major challenge in Hong Kong is to main-
tain deregulation and trade liberalization and to retain its status as a major
financial center.
A. Banking: Maintaining Hong Kong's Financial Autonomy
Hong Kong reverted to China's control on July 1, 1997, after over a
century of rule by the United Kingdom.' 99 China and the United Kingdom
agreed to the terms of Hong Kong's reversion in the 1984 Joint Declaration
(the "Joint Declaration"). 2 ' The Basic Law,20' enacted subject to the Joint
Declaration, provides Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy except in
the matters of defense and foreign affairs.2 2 China drafted the Basic Law
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic
of China mainly to facilitate the transfer of political authority.
197 "Asian Flu" refers to the period during which "Asian Stock markets from Tokyo to
Singapore" tumbled after "Hong Kong's upheaval." The turmoil spread rapidly through
European markets and to the US. See HK Upheaval Caused Global Shockwaves, FIN.
TwEs, Oct. 24, 1997, at 1.
198 See Basic Law, supra note 2.
'99See John H. Henderson, Notes, The Reintegration of Hong Kong into the People's Re-
public of China: What It Means to Hong Kong's Future Prosperity, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 503,514 (1995).
2°°See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, December 19, 1984, PRC-U.K., 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S.No.26 (Cmd. 9543).201 Article 109 of the Basic Law provides that the post-1997 government shall "provide
an appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of Hong Kong as an in-
ternational financial center." Article 110 of the Basic Law provides that the local Hong
Kong government shall "on its own, formulate monetary and financial policies, safeguard the
free operation of financial business and financial markets, and regulate and supervise them in
accordance with law." Article 11l of the Basic Law provides that the Hong Kong dollar
shall continue to circulate and that the authority to issue Hong Kong dollars must continue to
be backed by a 100 percent reserve. Article 112 of the Basic Law prohibits any foreign ex-
change control policies whatsoever, directs that the Hong Kong dollar shall remain freely
convertible, and requires free flow of capital. Additionally, Article 113 of the Basic Law
provides that the Hong Kong government, not the Chinese central government, shall control
the Exchange Fund, the currency reserve maintained to regulate the value of the Hong Kong
dollar. For further discussion of the interpretation of the Basic Law, see Albert H. Y. Chen,
The Basic Law and the Protection of Property Rights, 23 HONG KONG L. J. 55-62 (1993).
202 For a detailed discussion of Hong Kong's SAR, see Dobinson & Roebuck, supra note
56.
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Hong Kong and China will maintain two separate currencies and two
monetary systems in a mutually independent manner.20 3 To prepare for the
transfer to China, Hong Kong enacted new banking regulations to establish
independence for the new Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gov-
ernment. By establishing a quasi-central bank, the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority ("HKMA"), in 1993,2° 4 Hong Kong actually increased the level
of government supervision of banks.20 The HKMA not only formulates
and implements monetary policy and manages foreign reserves and gov-
ernment debts, it also maintains the stability and integrity of the monetary
and financial systems. 20 6 The HKMA exercises adequate supervision of fi-
nancial institutions and ensures appropriate liquidity to support the banks in
Hong Kong.
Under the "One country, Two systems" formulation, Hong Kong will
remain separate in several ways. It will remain a separate customs territory,
maintain separate currency and monetary systems, and retain its status as a
free port and financial center in the Asian area for at least fifty years. The
Hong Kong government retains sole control of the HKMA. As the master
of Hong Kong, the People's Bank of China will support the stability of
Hong Kong's currency. However, the Basic Law prevents China from
drawing on or resorting to Hong Kong's Exchange Fund or other assets in
order to keep HKMA an independent financial authority.
China realizes that ensuring Hong Kong's stability and prosperity will
be mutually beneficial to both Hong Kong and China. Under this philoso-
phy, China is likely to keep Hong Kong in its traditional role as China's
outlet to the world. Even prior to the turnover, most of China's capital was
transacted through the Hong Kong market. Hong Kong is likely to remain
203See Dai Xianglong, One State, Two Currencies, BANKER, Nov. 1996, at 100 (stating
that in order to maintain Hong Kong's prosperity, China adopted the "one state, two curren-
cies" system which allows Hong Kong to continue to have its existing currency system under
China's sovereignty).204 The HKMA was established on April 1, 1993 by merging Hong Kong's Office of the
Commissioner of Banking and the Office of the Exchange Fund. The HKMA is established
within the framework of the Hong Kong executive-led government and is accountable to the
Financial Secretary. The Exchange Fund Advisory Committee will continue to advise the
Financial Secretary on the control and management of the Exchange Fund and will serve as a
management board of the HKMA. See Hsu, supra note 196, at 221-29.205 See Henny Sender, Bank on Us, FAR E. ECON. REv., Nov. 17, 1994, at 66, 67 (report-
ing that government regulation of banking in Hong Kong, however, is still relatively lax).2°6The HKMA explicitly pegs the HK dollar against the US dollar. By enforcing the peg
to the US Dollar, the HKMA guarantees the price of the HK Dollar by trading through the
three commercial banks which are allowed to print money in Hong Kong. In return, the
banks receive certificates of indebtedness with which they can print the equivalent amount of
Hong Kong dollars at the official rate of HK$7.8 to the US$1. The process also works in re-
verse. If the banks have a surplus of Hong Kong notes, they can use them to redeem their
certificates of indebtedness, again at the official rate. See Dustsche Morgan Grenfell, Hong
Kong Banks and HighBOR, 47-50 (Nov. 1997).
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the gateway to China, and it is in China's best interest to observe the Joint
Declaration to its very letter.
Hong Kong's financial stability before and after July 1, 1997 is a criti-
cal international concern, as well as a local and regional one.207 As Hong
Kong is an international financial center, international traders have impor-
tant economic and financial interests at stake in a smooth and successful
transition to Chinese sovereignty. 208
Hong Kong is economically successful in large part because of its
service-based economy and liberalized financial system.20 9 Aside from Ja-
pan, Hong Kong is the main financial center in Asia. Not only does Hong
Kong's Basic Law contain specific commitments designed to maintain
Hong Kong's world-class financial status,210 Hong Kong also continues to
concentrate on maintaining its status as an international financial center to
ensure its future prosperity.2
1'
Hong Kong faces a number of challenges in the future. One of the
HKMA's main objectives is to ensure the safety and stability of Hong
Kong's banking system. The HKMA regulates the banking business and
the business of taking deposits through the supervision of authorized insti-
tutions. The HKMA employs the "continuous supervision" approach to fi-
nancial institutions. A wide variety of techniques are utilized to detect
problems at an early stage and ensure that banks have adequate internal
control systems to manage risks.
In supervising banks, the HKMA follows international practices as
recommended by the Basle Committee. For example, since late 1989, the
HKMA has applied the Basle Accords' capital adequacy framework and the
minimum standards for supervision of international financial groups. The
collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commercial Hong Kong in July 1991212
taught the HKMA that capital adequacy is a better criterion than any criteria
207 See Julia Charlton, A Guide to the Financial Markets in Hong Kong, at THE
ASIANLAW GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MARKErs, 65-70 (1998).2.See Issuing Securities: A Guide to Securities Regulation around the World, INT'L FIN.
L. REV. 24,24-32 (Mar. 1993).209As a result of Hong Kong's liberalized financial policy, eighty-five of the world's
largest one hundred banks have a presence in the Hong Kong banking market, which isAsia's second largest stock market after Japan. See Aasim M. Husain, Hong Kong, China in
Transition, FIN. & DEv., Sept. 1997, at 4.210See Article 109 of the Basic Law, supra note 2.211 China anticipates that Hong Kong will continue to conduct business in all convertible
currencies, while Shanghai will be a domestic financial center with business transacted inrenminbi. Because China views Hong Kong as a viable economic asset, China will likely
enshrine Hong Kong's extraordinary economic values by preserving the existing system.212In July 1991, the close of the Bank of Credit and Commercial Hong Kong [hereinafter
BCCHK] astonished Hong Kong's banking supervisory system. The revelation of wide-
spread fraudulent activities by the Bank of Credit of Commerce International, the parent
company of the BCCHK, resulted in the closing of the BCCHK. See Derek Roebuck et al.,
LAW RELATION TO BANKING IN HONG KONG 307-319 (2nd. ed. 1994).
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it had used before. This capital adequacy approach to supervision monitors
both the total of a bank's capital base and its relationship to the amount of
risk on the balance sheet.2 ' While the Basle Committee recommends a
minimum capital adequacy ratio of eight percent, the HKMA requires fif-
teen percent, far exceeding the Basle Committee's recommendation.2 14 The
high capital adequacy ratio requirement ensures Hong Kong's prudent su-
pervision and increased financial competition with large financial institu-
tions.
Following an amendment to the Banking Ordinance,2 15 HKMA's 1995
reforms focused on the efficiency and transparency of the banking system.
The HKMA introduced a revised policy on liquidity with provisions de-
signed to assure the quality of liquid assets held by banks. Additionally, the
HKMA required all authorized institutions to submit written statements on
their liquidity management policies. The HKMA also developed disclosure
requirements for bank balance sheets, including notification of transfers to
and from internal reserves. The HKMA also instituted a new policy for bi-
lateral netting arrangements. This policy was intended to lower the capital
required to insure transactions between banks.
Hong Kong has made significant progress in stabilizing its banking
system. Further, the HKMA continues to integrate the Basle Accords in its
development of capital adequacy ratios and in the promotion of prudential
supervision. Hong Kong should continue to adopt measures consistent with
the amendments of the Basle Accords so as to promote stability and inves-
tors confidence.
B. Securities: The Gradual Shift of Confidence in the Securities Markets
Hong Kong's stock market is one of the four largest securities markets
in the world. Established in 1891,216 the Hong Kong securities market is
213 See David Carse, Banking Supervision in the Practice of Central Banking in Hong
Kong, Development 68, 70-75 (Hong Kong Monetary Authority 1994).214 See Recent Developments in Banking and Finance in the People's Republic of China,
Hong Kong, and Taiwan: Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial
Service, H.R. Rep. No. 104-51, at 7 (1996); David Carse, THE FRAMEWORK OF BANKING
SUPERVISION: THE HONG KONG PERSPECTIVE 7 (March 1996) (reprinted in HKMA Quarterly
Bulletin Issue No.7).
215 See Roebuck, supra note 202, at 279.
216 Records of securities trading in Hong Kong date back to 1866, but the first formal
stock market, the Association of Stockbrokers in Hong Kong, was established in 1891. It
was renamed the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1914. In 1921, a second exchange, the
Hong Kong Association, was incorporated. The two exchanges merged to form the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange in 1947. The rapid growth of the Hong Kong economy led to the es-
tablishment of three other exchanges in the late 1960s and early 1970s, including the Far
East Exchange (1969), the Kam Ngan Stock Exchange (1971) and the Kowloon Stock Ex-
change (1972). However, prompted by the 1973 market crash and the need to strengthen
market surveillance, the Hong Kong government set up a working party to consider the uni-
fication of the four stock exchanges. As a result, a unified exchange, the Stock Exchange of
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also the world's eighth largest trading market. Despite the enormous
amount of trade between China and Hong Kong, Hong Kong must maintain
its own securities system in order to retain its position as a regional finan-
cial center. Hong Kong maintains a laissez-faire approach to investment
while exercising prudent market supervision. The combination of a con-
venient foreign capital exchange, duty-free trading, flat taxation on income,
and a solid legal foundation has spawned one of the most liberal economies
in the world.
The size of Hong Kong's securities market increased from the fif-
teenth-largest market in 1990 to the sixth-largest in terms of market capi-
talization in 1993. The SEHK is currently the eighth-largest securities
exchange in the world and the second-largest stock market in Asia.2 17
In addition to benefiting from geographic advantages, 21 8 Hong Kong
established itself as a liberal yet disciplined market for investors following
the market crash in October 1987. The SE-K underwent a complete re-
organization which led to the formation of a new Securities and Futures
Commission ("SFC")219 and a professional executive management team.220
The SFC protects the interests of stockholders by encouraging development
and by establishing safeguards for the SEHK.2 2' Minor protests were raised
regarding new classifications for initial public offerings that are based on
capital requirements, increased disclosure requirements for securities, and
new rules governing the use of derivatives.222 In spite of the protests, how-
ever, Hong Kong continued to be a disciplined financial market and its
regulatory framework remained in accordance with international stan-
dards.223
Hang Kong, was incorporated on July 7, 1980. The four exchanges ceased trading after the
close of business on March 27, 1986. A new era began with the commencement of trading
via a computerized system on the unified exchange on April 2, 1986. See Hsu, supra note
196, at 235-37.217 See Anthony Neoh, QC, Securities and Future Legislation in Hong Kong, CHINA L.
107 (July 1, 1997).
218 Hong Kong serves as an intermediary between London and New York, completing a
twenty-four-hour stock loop throughout the world. The Hong Kong time zone enables for-
eign market participants to bridge the gap between New York and London.219The Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong [hereinafter SFC] was estab-
lished on May 1, 1989 as an independent statutory body outside the Civil Service but still
forming part of the wider machinery of the Hong Kong government. The function of the
SFC is to administer the regulations relating to the trading of securities, futures, and lever-aged foreign exchange contracts in Hong Kong. These regulations are designed to ensure
that the financial community operates with integrity so that the interests of investors are
protected. The SFC is also charged with facilitating and encouraging the development of
Hong Kong's markets. See SFC at <http://www.hksfc.org.hklenglindex.htm>.
2°0 See Richard Yan-Ki Ho et al., THE HONG KONG FINANCIAL SYSTEM 28 (1991).
221 See SFC, supra note 219.
2 id.
223See Hsu, supra note 196, at 243-45.
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The SEHK serves as an important link between China and international
capital markets. The SEHK is China's primary channel for raising equity
capital for Chinese state enterprises. Included on the SEHK's listing are
some seventeen Chinese companies, whose shares are classifies as "H"
shares. "H" shares, commonly referred to as "red chips," accounted for
one-tenth of the SEHK's trading volume during their peak in 1993. Since
maintaining Hong Kong's prosperity will benefit China,224 coordination
between the two regions will instill confidence in investors throughout both
Hong Kong and China.
Although the SEEK currently serves as the "gateway" into China, the
rapid development of the Shanghai and Shenzhen securities markets may
hinder the future growth of the SEHK. The Shanghai Stock Exchange
served as the largest regional securities market prior to the 1949 Chinese
Civil War. Shanghai will probably regain that status as China integrates
with the international market. Despite these problems, Hong Kong can re-
tain a prominent role in the development of the southern provinces and
continue to serve as China's link to Southeast Asia's developing coun-
tries.225
As an international financial center, the development of Hong Kong's
securities market depends on international capital. Hong Kong is an inte-
grated financial center and the movement of capital is not restricted. Free-
dom of capital has both advantages and disadvantages for Hong Kong as an
international financial center. One disadvantage is that with no capital re-
strictions, an exodus of capital is just as likely as an influx of capital, mak-
ing it a particularly volatile market.
Because of its open market status and geographic location, the Hong
Kong securities market is extremely sensitive to international affairs and to
the ebb and flow of foreign capital. For example, the SEEK is extremely
sensitive to U.S. interest rates and local property prices.226 Similarly, eco-
nomic and political developments in China and Taiwan, inevitably have an
impact on the SEEK.227 When the Hang Seng Index, the exponent of the
SEHK, dropped seven percent in March 1996, this was seen as a reaction to
both military tensions between China and Taiwan and a drop in the US
stock market.
228
In sum, it is clear that Hong Kong plays an integral role in the world
trading market. Certainly, international affairs will continue to have sig-
2 24 See Yun-Wing Sun, THE CHINA-HONG KONG CONNECTION: THE KEY TO CHINA'S
OPEN-DOOR POLICY 16 (1991) (stating that Hong Kong served as an important financial in-
termediary for China).225 Christopher Langley, Benefiting from the Liberalization of China's Financial Markets,
CHINA 1998, 1, 2 (1998).
226 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-5 supra note 214, at 61 (statement of William H. Overholt).
27 id"
228 id.
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nificant effects on Hong Kong's continued economic development. These
effects will determine the extent of Hong Kong's influences on the interna-
tional economy.
VI. FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS' OPERATION WITHIN THE CHINESE
ECONOMIC AREA AS EVALUATED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL
TREATMENT
Given the proliferation of financial institutions from countries around
the world, the concept of national treatment has been proposed to deal with
multinational financial regulation. National treatment is equal opportunity
in an international trade regime.229 National treatment is intended to pro-
vide a level playing field for foreign and domestic financial institutions.230
A country will adopt a national treatment policy if it believes competition in
financial services is healthy and beneficial.231
Foreign financial institutions in Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan are
catalogued into a two-tiered system. Treatment varies according to the re-
gion in which a corporation operates. In Hong Kong, foreign financial in-
stitutions are treated in a manner similar to domestic institutions. China is
considering reforming regulations to encourage further international par-
ticipation in the banking industry. The new regulations may ease the geo-
graphic restrictions which currently limit the locations where foreign
institutions can establish offices.
National treatment in financial services is also emphasized by the
WTO under GATS.23  GATS recommends full market access and national
treatment for WTO members.23 3 The WTO applies an impartial dispute-
settlement mechanism to ensure the implementation of national treatment.
Consequently, all CEA members must conform to national treatment stan-
dards in order to receive WTO approval.
229 See Tycho H.E. Stahl, Liberalization International Trade in Services: The Case for
Sidesteeping the GA 7, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 405, 418 (1994).
230 GATS, supra note 31, art. XVII (stating that national treatment entitles foreign firms
to the same business opportunities and treatment as domestic firms, thereby establishing a
basic standard of equality between foreign and domestic products sold within a country).
231 See Stahl, supra note 229, at 451.
232See Frances Williams & Guy Jonquieres, WTO Pact Will Open Financial Services
Sector, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1997, at I (reporting that the WTO will open financial services
markets to an unprecedented degree and provide lasting benefits to WTO members because
foreign financial institutions will enjoy the same treatment as domestic financial institu-
tions).
233 See Financial Services Talks Resume, WTO Focus, May 1997, at 1, 8.
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A. Hong Kong: Accommodating National Treatment to Foreign
Institutions
Hong Kong offers no barriers to foreign bank branch operations and
securities firms registered on the SEHK.234 Although overseas banks that
were granted licenses after 1978 may maintain branch offices in only one
building, this limitation on location was modified in 1994 to permit foreign
banks to establish regional offices and other offices in buildings separate
from the branch office.
Foreign banks may also acquire a controlling interest in a local bank
that has unlimited branching rights. In 1996, 154 international banks oper-
ated in Hong Kong and over 1,600 firms and over 16,000 individuals were
registered on Hong Kong's securities market.235
1. Banking Sector
Hong Kong's use of national treatment has made it generally regarded
as one of the most open and favorable regulatory environments in Asia for
foreign financial institutions, and as a result it has a large foreign bank
236presence. With its transparent banking regulations, Hong Kong does not
place restrictions on cross-border capital flows. Foreign banking institu-
tions operating in Hong Kong are treated in a manner similar to domestic
institutions, though the reporting and capital adequacy standards applied to
all banks are somewhat demanding.
Hong Kong's position as an international financial center is a result of
the free flow of capital, independent monetary and taxation systems, a
regulatory environment conductive to international transactions, and na-
tional treatment for foreign financial institutions. In terms of applying
comprehensive banking supervision, Hong Kong supervises foreign and
domestic banking institutions equally by creating a level playing field for
banking activities. As a result of implementing the concept of national
treatment, Hong Kong attracts more foreign banks to Hong Kong, and this
enriches the Hong Kong financial market.
2. Securities Sector
By its efforts to organize a free market, Hong Kong has become a pro-
ponent of national treatment. The dynamism of Hong Kong's economy de-
rives from its unique capitalistic economy and free society. Hong Kong has
placed no discriminatory legal constraints on foreign securities firms that do
their business in Hong Kong via branching, acquisition, or by establishing
subsidiaries. In practice, foreign firms typically establish themselves in
234 See Anthony Neoh, Q.C., Financial Legal Institutions in Hong Kong's Transition, 18
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 31, 34 (1997).
2351d., at 36.
236See National Treatment, supra note 32, at 218.
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Hong Kong using subsidiaries. Rules governing their operations are the
same, however, irrespective of ownership.
After China assumed control in July 1997, Hong Kong was expected to
become China's international financial center. Hong Kong's financial mar-
ket is expected to be interdependent with China's developing financial cen-
ters in Shanghai and Shenzhen. 23  In addition, Hong Kong's free stock
market provides China's state-owned enterprises with a means for raising
capital. Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong treats China's enterprises as for-
eign companies. As China controls Hong Kong, Hong Kong's stock market
gives Chinese companies greater weight in the Hang Seng index.238
China's state-controlled companies, known as "H"-Shares and Hong Kong-
based window companies of Chinese provinces, cities, and ministries are
listed on HIKSE to raise capital. China's participation in Hong Kong is also
expected to expand the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.239
In general, Hong Kong is poised to play a critical role in the interna-
tional financial market. In preparation for this role, and in order to compete
with other international financial centers, Hong Kong has adopted flexible
measures to attract foreign financial institutions. For example, in 1984, the
IKSE decided to allow foreign-domiciled companies to be listed instead of
listing only domestic corporations.24 °
B. China: Adjusting Treatment of Foreign Financial Institutions
China's past stringent regulations means China is only now consider-
ing national treatment policies. At present, foreign financial institutions
face geographic limitations on the location of their commercial establish-. 241...
ments in China. Severe restrictions are also imposed on foreign financial
institutions, limiting the scope of their business operations in China.242 To
garner consideration for WTO membership, China should meet the WTO's
237See Henderson, supra note 199, at 540.
238See Louise Lucas, Hang Seng to Give Chinese More Weight, FIN. TimEs., December
17, 1997, at 28.
2'9See Donna Deese Skeen, Can Capitalism Survive under Communist Rule? The Effect
of Hong Kong's Reversion to the People's Republic of China in 1997, 29 INT' LAW. 175, 190
(1995).240In 1984, Hong Kong amended its securities regulations for foreign companies which
were unsatisfied by their inability to be listed on the HKSE. The Jardines group, after nearly
140 years on HKSE, proposed registering in Bermuda because Hong Kong would not list the
group on the HKSE. By 1996, after the new securities regulations were promulgated, nearly
sixty percent of the 567 companies listed on the HKSE were foreign companies. See Neoh,
supra note 234, at 34.241 See 1. A. Tokley & Tina Ravn, BANKING LAW IN CHINA 263 (1997).242See Geng Xiao, China's Money and Banking in 1990s, in PRC POLITICAL ECONOMY:
PROSPECTS UNDER JIANG ZEMIN 207, 214-22 (Hsin-hsing We eds. 1999).
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trade standards by opening China's financial markets to other WTO mem-
bers with MFN and national treatment.243
1. Banking Sector
All aspects of the Chinese banking system are heavily regulated. The
People's Bank of China sets interest and deposit rates and overall bank
lending is administratively controlled through the government's credit
plan.2S The establishment of a foreign bank in China is subject to China's
Regulation for the Administration of Foreign Funded Financial Institu-
tions. 245 Foreign banks are also very limited in the range of operations al-
lowed under the Commercial Banking Law.2 " Foreign banks may only
participate in wholesale banking, which includes areas such as letters of
credit, export credits, and commercial loan syndication.
Foreign banks need to apply for permission to conduct renminbi busi-
ness. Currently, China permits nine foreign banks to use renminbi.247
However, these foreign banks are restricted to trading renminbi only with
foreign-invested enterprises and foreigners. The foreign banks are still pro-
hibited from doing renminbi business with China's domestic enterprises.248
Between March and June 1997, Chinese customers deposited 215 million
renminbi into foreign banks.249 The nine foreign banks also transacted 103
million renminbi in loans and overdrafts during the same period.25 °
Foreign banks should be able to open branches, export credits, and of-
fer commercial loan syndication.251 They are allowed to open branches and
subsidiaries (joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned entities) in only thir-
teen selected cities and special economic zones. Outside these specified ar-
eas, banks are restricted to opening representative offices that may not
engage in profit-making activities. Despite these restrictions, the number of
foreign banks in China has steadily increased over the last several years.
243 See Nancy Dunne, Congress Seeks to End China's Trade Status Battle, Attempt to
Nudge Beiing to Enter the WTO on US Terms, Fin. Times, Nov. 5, 1997, at 1.
2'See Survey China: The Death of Gradualism, THE EcoNoMisT, March 8, 1997, at 16.245 See Lardy, supra note 188, at 166 (stating the Regulation for the Administration of
Foreign Funded Financial Institutions confirm the long-standing, two-stage process for a for-
eign financial institution to register for business in China).2461d.
247 See China Temporarily Stops Inviting Foreigners to Trade in Local Currency, WORLD
J., Sept. 27, 1997, at B6 (reporting that in March 1997, China chose nine foreign banks to
conduct renminbi business in Shanghai as an experiment. However, in September 1997
China decided not to issue permission to new applicants until further notice).





251See Survey China, supra note 244.
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Because of greater pressure from foreign banks, increased internation-
alization of financial services, and to gain WTO membership, China began
to change the banking system for foreign institutions.252 In the early 1990s,
China began reforming its foreign exchange control system. China insti-
tuted a uniform dual-exchange rate system for renminbi aimed at making
renminbi a fully convertible free currency by the year 2000.253 In addition,
China has opened major cities (in addition to Shanghai) to foreign financial
institutions in March 1999, and China also has permitted foreign banks to
participate in some local banking and non-banking financial business.
Even though China is not immediately ready to completely liberalize
its financial sector, China is likely to reform its financial system gradually.
As China participates more fully in the global economy,25 4 developed
countries will likely pressure China to reform its financial sector to allow
their banks into in China. 5  Such pressure will likely hasten China's re-
form schedule. For example, China has promised to open five more special
economic zones where foreign banks may freely trade renminbi two years
after it enrolls in the WTO.
25P
2. Securities Sector
National treatment has not been used in China partly because its equity
market is so new, and is still in flux. The lack of clarity in regulations
poses a significant problem to both domestic and foreign securities firms.
Foreign securities firms may establish representative offices, but are not
permitted to establish either local branches or local subsidiaries.2 7 Repre-
sentative offices are limited to brokering selected equity shares.
China breaches the principle of national treatment when it classifies
shares as "A" and "B" and when it restricts foreign investors' trade in stock.
Foreign investors may not trade in "A" shares. They may only invest in
252See Nancy Dunne, Congress Seeks to End China Trade Status Battle, Attempt to
Nudge Beijing to Enter the WTO on US Terms, FIN. TiMes. Nov. 5, 1997, at 1.253 See James Harding, Jitter in Beiing- China May Not Be Able to Remain Alooffrom
the Crisis in South-East Asia That it Helped Set in Train, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at 19
(stating that China adopts a step-by-step process to achieve full financial liberalization in-
cluding currency convertibility by 2000).
2mAsia's financial turmoil reverberated recognition in China of the country's role and re-
sponsibilities within the global economy. For the first time, China has participated in a re-
gional bailout committing $1billion to the International Monetary Fund-led fund to support
the Thailand financial crisis. See Harding, id.
255See Rachel Marajee, A Long March Ahead, Banker July 1997, at 6.
'-See Foreign Banks Allowed to Trade Renminbi in Five More Locations in China,
(Dec. 15, 1997) <http://w3.ttnn.com/cna/971215/b1O.html> (reporting that under the pres-
sure of the WTO, China agreed to open five more locations for foreign banks to trade ren-
minbi).257An exception to this policy is that in October 1994, a joint venture investment bank
was authorized which included U.S. participation.
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corporations offering governmentally approved and listed "B" shares. 258
These selected "B" shares are sold exclusively to foreigners and must be
purchased with foreign currencies.
In addition, national treatment is frustrated since foreign firms are re-
quired to hire local Chinese staff through an approved labor supplier. For-
eign firms in China mainly underwrite offshore equity and bond issues for
domestic Chinese companies. However, each new issue must receive prior
approval from the Chinese government.25 9 China has offered to relax re-
strictions on foreign securities firms but only for foreign firms engaged in
non-profit activities.
China has political incentives to promote the transfer of capital and
technologies from Taiwan to China. Therefore, China treats Taiwanese
firms more preferentially than other foreign firms. Although Taiwan does
not currently allow Chinese companies to list their shares on the Taiwan
Stock Exchange, China does allow Taiwanese-investedfirms to list on
China's equity markets.260 Thus, it is clear that China generously contrib-
utes to Taiwan's activity in China's financial market.
C. Taiwan: Lacking Reciprocal Treatment of Chinese Financial Institutions
The liberalization and deregulation of Taiwan's banking system pro-
vides most foreign financial institutions, including banks and securities
firms.. with treatment similar to their domestic counterparts. However, due
to nafional security considerations and memories of the painful Chinese Fi-
nancial Crisis in 1946-1949, Taiwan prohibits China's financial institutions
from operating in Taiwan.
1. Banking Sector
In 1953, when the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank of Japan established itself as
the first foreign bank in Taiwan, these banks occupied merely a peripheral
position in Taiwan's financial system. At that time, foreign banks provided
only four percent of the lending that domestic banks provided. As of Octo-
ber 1996, foreign banks represented only five percent of the total assets held
by all financial institutions in Taiwan.2 61 By the end of June 1997, forty-
four foreign banks from nineteen countries established seventy branches in
258 See Jia Zhao, Trading Stocks in China: Development, Regulations, Issues and Pro-
spectus, E. AsIAN EXEC. REP., June 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEws LIBRARY, EASIAN
FILE.259Under the 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, which socially
authorizes each regional Congress or its standing committee to enact regional laws and
regulations effective within their jurisdiction, an issue of securities must receive approval
from the department-in-charge prior to submission to the People's Bank of China. See Tan,
supra note 172, at 77.260 See Heda Bayron, Even Hong Kong's Blue Chips Turn Red, ASIAMONEY, June 1997.261See Asia's Economic Crisis, How Far is Down, THE EcONOMIST, Nov. 15, 1997, at 20.
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Taiwan.262 Additionally, twenty-eight foreign banks had representative of-
fices in Taiwan.
263
Taiwan anticipates that foreign banks will play a more active role in
the domestic market.264 Thus, Taiwan has made a number of improvements
in its treatment of foreign banks. A ban on foreign investments in local
banks was lifted in June 1994, although the individual investor limit is
capped at five percent of the bank's equity. Also, restrictions on the geo-
graphic location of banks and the number of bank branches were eliminated
in August 1994, when the MOF decreased the restrictions on the entry of
foreign bank branches.26S Waiting periods for sub-branching were reduced
from five to two years. However, this remains discriminatory since domes-
tic banks are not subject to the same delay.
While Taiwan envisions greater foreign bank involvement, the activi-
ties of these bank branches continue to be restricted by the amount of their
local capital as compared to their parent company's global capital. In addi-
tion, access to local funding continues to pose a problem. Foreign banks
are forced to rely heavily on a continually illiquid inter-bank market be-
cause of restrictions on the terms of foreign exchange liabilities and posi-
tion-taking.266 Foreign banking institutions are also subject to limitations
on guarantees of commercial paper that do not apply to their domestic com-
petitors.26 7 Thus far, Taiwan has modeled its financial system to reduce
substantial barriers to market access and to provide national treatment for
foreign financial institutions.268
Due to the financial separation after 1949, Taiwan does not give na-
tional treatment to Chinese financial institutions. Taiwan instead designed
a system of national security that prevents China from manipulating Tai-
wan's economy.269 Taiwan prohibits any direct banking connections with
262The Ministry of Finance [hereinafter MOF], Basic Financial Statistics (Jun. 1997).
263id.
264See Liu, supra note 88, 207 (1996).265The MOF abolished the restriction on location of branches of foreign banks since late
1996.
266See the MOF. Guidelines for Screening and Approval of Establishing of Branches
and Representative Offices by Foreign Banks.267 See Art. 4 of Trust Company Regulations, recognizing foreign banking as a trust com-
pany which is partly regulated by the Trust Company Regulations.
268 See Ya-Hwei Yang, Development and Structure Change of the Banking System, in
THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, KOREA, AND TAIWAN: GROWTH, REPRESSION, AND
LMERALIZATION 228, 259 (Hung T. Patrick & Yung Chiu Park ed. 1994).
269 In 1992, Taiwan enacted Statute Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan
Area and Mainland Area. In terms of this Statute, Taiwan reserves the right to refuse in-
vestments by companies from any territory, including Hong Kong, with over twenty percent
Mainland Chinese shareholding. See New Emphasis on Old Rules, BANKER, July 1997, at
73.
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financial institutions from China. Nonetheless, Taiwan allows its banks to
have direct connections with China's banks through overseas branches.27 °
Although Taiwan prohibits the entry of Chinese banking operations,
Taiwan has a much more amiable relationship with Hong Kong. However,
Taiwanese banks have reservations about entering the Hong Kong financial
markets due to Hong Kong's recent transfer to China. Taiwanese banks are
also reluctant to open operations in China due to the dim prospects for
quick liberalization in China. Because of these difficulties, Taiwanese
banks seek other markets besides those of Hong Kong and China.27 1 One
way to establish business in other international financial centers, such as the
United States and Singapore, would be to offer reciprocal treatment to
banks from those countries.
2. Securities Sector
To create a capital market for private enterprise, Taiwan intensified its
efforts to liberalize and internationalize its securities market by allowing
participation of foreign investors beginning in 1982.272 Under the Regula-
tions for Investments in Securities by Overseas and Foreign Nationals and
Their Exchange Settlement,2 73 foreign investors are provided with three
ways to access Taiwan's securities market. First, any foreign investors may
invest in a securities operation through a joint venture with Taiwanese part-
ners.274 Second, foreign securities firms may establish branch operations.
Third, foreign banks with branches in Taiwan may also establish a securi-
ties operation.
Before July 1993, only three foreign securities firms could establish
branches in Taiwan, and each could only establish one branch. From July
1993 to February 1994, restrictions on branching in Taiwan were eased.
For example, foreign firms that establish Taiwan-based securities branches
are no longer required to be one of the ten largest brokers, in terms of as-
sets, in their home countries. Similarly, foreign firms no longer face dis-
criminatory capital requirements. In January 1994, all foreign ownership
270See Deborah Shen, Three-way Hong Kong Bank Plan, FREE CHINA J. Dec. 27, 1996, at
8 (mentioning that Taiwan allows banks to connect with Chinese banks indirectly rather than
directly).
271 For example, the presence of an estimated $3 billion in Taiwanese manufacturers' in-
vestment in Vietnam has made Ho Chi Minh City a more feasible option for new and old
Taiwanese banks.
272
See Chen & Huang, supra note 135, at 37 & n 37.
273 See QFII Regulations, supra note 126.
274Foreign nationals are allowed to invest in a securities company to engage in securities
operations, but a prior approval of the Securities Exchange Commission is required. Such
investments have to go through the review process pursuant to the Statute of Investment by
Foreign Nationals. The total amount of foreign ownership in a securities business entity,
however, may not exceed forty percent of its paid-in capital. Furthermore, each foreign in-
vestor may only invest up to ten percent of the total paid-in capital of the entity.
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restrictions were abolished. Thus, U.S. firms may now create one hundred
percent-owned subsidiaries and participate freely in joint ventures.
Foreign and domestic firms are able to provide essentially the same se-
curities services, which include brokering, dealing, underwriting, and secu-
rities financing. 275 Foreign securities firms may provide brokerage services
for local investors wanting to purchase shares listed in New York, London,
and Tokyo, but firms from Taiwan are currently unable to offer similar
services.
Although Taiwan liberalized foreign investment in the Taipei stock
market in 1995, some restrictions still apply to foreign institutional inves-
tors. Foreign institutional investors are subject to a US$400 million indi-
vidual investment limit and a US$7.5 billion aggregate investment limit.
2 77
In addition, foreign institutional investors are subject to restrictions for the
repatriation of capital and earnings.78 Further, there is a twenty percent
foreign ownership limit for individual institutional investors and a ten per-
cent foreign aggregate limit.2 79 Since 1996, natural persons from foreign
nations have been able to trade directly on the Taipei stock exchange or
hold equity and debt instruments listed on the exchange.280 Loosening the
restrictions on foreign investors increases a potentially large component of
the prospective brokerage business of foreign firms. Further liberalization
will expand the Taiwanese securities market and may attract more foreign
investors.
VII. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHINESE
ECONOMIC AREA
The considerable integration of international financial relationships in
recent decades contrasts sharply with the sluggishness of the CEA's prog-
ress in this area.281 However, the primary reason for the lethargic progress
of the CEA in financial sectors is the fact that the CEA is not a formally
integrated financial area.282
275 See Chen & Huang, supra note 135, at 43.
276 See Brian W. Semkow, A Synopsis of Current Finqancial Deregulation and Interna-
tional of Financial Markets and Institutions in Taiwan, 6 J. INT'L BANKING L. 353, 357
(1991).






281 As discussed previously, the success of the CEA is dependent on its members' efforts
to reform their financial markets to conform to the standards of the international financial
system. The soundness and safety of financial markets are the policies' driving future ad-
justments and developments in the CEA's banking sectors. See pages 5-8.282See Jones, supra note 3, at 14.
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As a result, to establish a sound financial system, a satisfactory CEA
framework for banking regulation would require that CEA entities adopt the
principles of the Basle Accords. However, political controversies between
Taiwan and China may retard this formal adoption and application of the
Basle Accords. In achieving the purpose of a sound financial system within
the CEA, each CEA member should accept the mandates of the Basle Ac-
cordS individually and thus utilize the Basle Accords as "soft law. 2 3
Soft laws may overcome deadlocks in international relations that result
from economic or political differences.28 4 International banking regulators
have recognized the benefits of soft law and established a global banking
supervisory regime, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision.
As a soft law of international banking supervisory standards, the Basle
Accords continue to strengthen the supervisory and regulatory infrastruc-
ture by reformulating both capital adequacy requirements2 5 and the internal
risk management controls of banks.28  Until recently, capital adequacy re-
quirements have served as the most important tool of bank supervisors and
regulators. The CEA financial regulators should design a new, more strin-
gent set of regulatory capital requirements for banks that operate in high-
risk and fast-changing environments.
Since adoption of the Basle Accords will be informal, the CEA may
use alternative approaches to harmonize its banking supervisory standards.
The European Union ("EU") presents an appropriate model of convergence
in fundamental supervisory standards which could be emulated by the
CEA.287 In January 1993, the EU achieved a single market for financial
288services through three measures. First, it harmonized the essential stan-
dards for prudential supervision of banking and for the protection of inves-
tors, depositors, and consumers. Second, it required mutual recognition
283See discussion of soft law, supra note 39.
2
84See Joseph Gold, INTERPRETATION: THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 301-02
(1996).
285 See Peter C. Hayward, Prospects for International Cooperation by Bank Supervision,
24 INT'L L. 787 (1990).
286 See David Folkerts-Landau & Takatoshi Ito, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET
DEVELOPMENTS, PROSPECTS AND POLICY ISSUES 141 (1995) (noting that the Basle Committee
devised new approaches to using internal risk-management models for the calculation of
capital requirements).
287 See Michael Gruson & Wolfgang Feuring, A European Union Banking Law: The Sec-
ond Banking and Related Directives, in THE SINGLE MARKET AND THE LAW OF BANKING 25,
35 (Ross Cranston 2d ed. 1995) (noting that the EU's Second Directive standardized the
banking law of the Member States by harmonizing minimum capital for authorization and
continuing business; granting supervisory control of banks' participation in the non-bank
sector and supervisory control of major shareholders).
2111d. at 25.289 The Second Council Directive on the Co-ordination of Law, Regulations and Admin-
istrative Provisions Relating to the Taking-up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institu-
tions and Amending Directive 77/88/EEC [hereinafter Second Directive] (emphasizing that
The Challenge for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan
20:1 (1999)
of the way each Member State applied those essential standards.290 Third, it
emphasized home country control and supervision of financial institutions
operating in other Member States.29' As a result, all banks in the EU are
subject to common minimum standards of banking supervision. Using this
EU model, the CEA could successfully incorporate the international bank-
ing standards of the Basle Accords.
As it evolves into an integrated financial market, the CEA should re-
consider private internal risk management as a foundation for ensuring in-
dividual financial institutions' stability and reduction in systemic risk. One
possibility would be for the CEA to develop new regulatory capital re-
quirements. Such a new set of requirements could allow banks to use their
own modes of international risk-management to estimate "value-at-risk," an
important component for determining their regulatory capital require-
ments.29 2 As a consequence, the CEA regulators and financial institutions
should encourage banks to actively participate in the design of the frame-
work for establishing capital requirements.
In addition, the CEA's policy in the banking sector should consider
three fundamental features to converge national banking regulations: the
harmonization of banking regulations, the mutual recognition of financial
standards, and the home country control principle. One of the long-term ef-
forts of the CEA's financial community has been to implement the first of
these features in the CEA. However, meticulous harmonization efforts in
the EU banking sector have proven to be impractical and cumbersome.294
Given the example of the EU's harmonization, efforts by the CEA might
achieve the same result; however, harmonization of the essential regulatory
the Member States of the EU must harmonize their national banking laws and practices and
the required results to be achieved by January 1, 1993).
29Oid.
291 See Brealey & Quigley, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMuNiTy - 1992 HANDBOOK 126 (G. Hufbauer ed. 1990).292See Folkerts-Landau & Ito, supra note 286, at 141(defining "value-at-risk" as an esti-
mate of the "maximum" loss in the value of a portfolio or financial position over a given
time period with a certain level of confidence).293The 1995 failure of Barings, a well-capitalized institution, suggests that markets, op-
eration risk, and internal management controls are extremely important elements of risk
management. See Sheila C. Bair, Lessons from the Barings Collapse, 64 FORDHAM L. REv.
1,4-5 (1995).294This experience, coupled with the urgency of completing the common banking market
by 1992, has prompted the European Commission to shift its policy emphasis. The Euro-
pean Commission has adopted the harmonization of banking legislation and the mutual rec-
ognition of supervisory standards as its main tools for integration in the financial field. See
U. H.. Schneider, The Harmonization of EC Banking Laws: the Euro-Passport to Profitabil-
ity and International Competitiveness of Financial Institutions, 22 LAW & POLICY IN INT'S
Bus., 261, 267-76 (1991).
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elements for EU Member States includes the prudential principles of main-
taining sound and stable banks and other financial institutions.
The CEA can employ the EU single banking model to harmonize
banking standards. Convergence of the CEA's banking standards will allow
the banks of one CEA member to establish branches within other CEA
members. The concept of "mutual recognition' 296 means that bank ap-
proval by one member country's banking authorities will open the market to
all member countries.297 The CEA's application of the EU's "mutual rec-
ognition" concept would be a crucial step towards the harmonization of the
CEA's banking supervisory system.
Under the concept of mutual recognition, each CEA member will
maintain home country control over banking regulations.2 98 In contrast, the
host country will only have the authority to supervise branch liquidity or
marketing-related activities. If a home country's rules are more liberal than
those in the host country, the home country's financial firms will be able to
offer a wider range of services and will not be subject to the same regula-
tory costs as the host country's own financial firms. The expected result
under these competitive circumstances will be that the regulations "will all
eventually converge to the same minimum essential standards and the wid-
est range of permissible powers. 299 This process is known as "regulatory
convergence. 
3 °°  p
295 Even though the White Paper (the proposal of EU Financial Integration) refers to
"minimum harmonization" of prudential standards, it is not to be construed as an endorse-
ment of the lowest common denominator or an alignment with the most relaxed supervisory
standards of any Member State. See George S. Zavvos, The Banking Perspective of 1992,
EUR. AFF., Jan. 1988, at 100.296Mutual recognition is consistent with the EU's open market philosophy. Under this
philosophy, the EU stresses that its power should be activated only when it can deliver a
"public good" that cannot be effectively provided at a national level (e.g., the protection of a
depositor or investor, or the safety and stability of the financial system). See Christos Had-
jiemmanuil, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AND BANKING SUPERVISION, 12-9 (1996).297The mutual recognition endorsed in the EU's White Paper in 1985 constitutes a major
integration technique in the financial field. Since the White Paper is incorporated in the EC
Treaty provisions concerning professional qualifications, this concept was already known in
Community law. See George S. Zavvos, Towards a European Banking Act, 25 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 263 (1988). In addition, prior to the adoption of the White Paper, the Com-
mission had proposed a mortgage credit directive based entirely on this approach. Id.298 See Second Derivative, supra note 289.299See GAO, European Community: U.S. Financial Services' Competitiveness under the
Single Market Program 59, 60 (1990) (indicating that the EU should improve its banking
supervisory framework by converging the banking law and practices of the national Member
States).3
00See Joseph Norton, EU Banking Law in the International Context, in THE SINGLE
MARKET AND THE LAW OF BANKING (Ross Cranston 2d ed. 1995).
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Regulatory convergence in the CEA will promote shared responsibil-
ity, as recommended by the Basle Accords. 30' All the activities of banks
and other financial institutions, provided by branching or cross-border pro-
vision of services, will be supervised by coordination between host and
home authorities. 0 2
Certain exceptions should be made for the three general policies. The
potential coordination of economic and monetary policies in the CEA re-
quires that the host authority be responsible for the supervision of liquidity.
Similarly, the host authority should monitor the monetary provisions re-
garding the market risk related to securities. Finally, the framework should
ensure the cooperation of the home country's authorities in the field of
303banking supervision.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan constitute one of the world's most vi-
brant economic regions.3°4 Each entity has supported continued economic
development using different methods. However, increased internationali-
zation within the region suggests the development of sophisticated banking
and securities markets for all participants' countries.305
The members of the CEA currently retain their own banking systems
and supervisory regulations which inhibit and render ineffective the super-
vision of financial institutions conducting inter-entity business within the
CEA. The different banking systems that exist in China, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan have been shaped by history, politics, and cultural traditions. The
financial systems of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have evolved in differ-
ent fashions according to Marxist principles, 30 6 market competition, and
concerns for national security, respectively. Each of the three banking sys-
tems has different features and drawbacks and present alternative methods
of financial development.
301 See Susan M. Phillips, International Competitions; Should We Harmonize Our Na-
tional Regulatory Systems?, in BANKING SOUNDNESS AND MONETARY POLICY, ISSUE AND
EXPERIENCES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 527, 533 (Charles Enoch & John H. Green ed. 1997)
(finding that in order to improve banking supervision, the BIS and EU started harmonization
of banking laws, regulations, and operating standing).
302See Nancy Louise Kessler, Banking on Europe: 1992 and EMU, 60 FORDHAM L. Rnv.
s395, s404 (1992).303See Folkerts-Landau and Ito, supra note 286, at 17.3
04See Barry Naughton, The Future in the China Circle, in THE CHINA CIRCLE:
ECONOMICS AND ELECTRONICS IN THE PRC, TAIWAN, AND HONG KONG 289 (Barry Naughton
ed., 1997).305 See A Survey of International Banking, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 1999, at 24.3
06 See Alan S. Greenspan, Thoughts about the Transitioning Market Economies of East-
ern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L. J. 1, 13 (1994) (indicating that
Marxist ideology presumed competition to be destructive and that the centrally planned
economies of the Soviet bloc organized their production around state monopolies).
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In the past, Taiwan and China utilized banks to stimulate economic
growth whereas Hong Kong used financial development to promote eco-
nomic prosperity. Along with continuing economic integration, a stable fi-
nancial system will continue to play an integral role in the economic
development of the CEA. Taiwan should implement reforms which guar-
antee greater privatization, liberalization, and internationalization, while
China should separate its state-owned enterprises from commercial
banks. °7 Additionally, China should impose strict loan restrictions on
state-owned enterprises in order to reduce the amount of bad debts.0 8 To
ensure Hong Kong's future financial success, China must cultivate its rela-
tionship with Hong Kong and sustain Hong Kong's financial autonomy and
stability.
Energetic securities markets provide an additional influx of capital that
expands businesses and broadens the economy. However, Taiwan's securi-
ties market requires stringent regulations to prevent manipulation of the
market. Although enacting a consistent national framework for securities
transactions, China should make an effort to simplify the classification of
share types. Hong Kong should provide assurances of financial autonomy
in order to instill confidence in investors.
The CEA should consider the implications of the internationalization
of the securities business. Further, the October 1997 Asian stock market
crash exemplifies the increased integration of the worldwide securities in-
dustry.0 9 Problems from Southeast Asia gradually influenced the currency
rates and stock markets of both Taiwan and Hong Kong.310 Therefore,
greater internationalization not only facilitates economic growth but also
requires controls to avoid potential global financial crises.
National treatment provides a level playing field for all foreign and
domestic financial institutions. While all domestic and foreign financial in-
stitutions operating in Hong Kong receive equal treatment, China does not
accord national treatment to foreign financial firms who wish to operate
there. Taiwan accords national treatment to all firms excluding those from
China. Providing national treatment to all firms will permit Taiwan and
307 See Che-Ning Liu, From Cashiers to Banks: Banking Reform in the People's Republic
of China and the Emergence of Banks as Financial Intermediaries, 6 CHINA L. REP. 103, 121
(1990).
308See Eric Girardin, BANKING SECTOR REFORM AND CREDIT CONTROL IN CHINA 30
(1997).
3 09See Will the World Slump? THE ECONOMIsT, Nov. 15, 1997, at 15 (stating that global-
ization and technological advances promote the international securities market; as a result,
the Asian stock markets' tumble spread worldwide).
31°See the "Asian Flu" supra note 197. Following other South-East Asian countries,
Taiwan's stock market dropped 380 points on October 20, 1997. The SEHK had record
losses during the same period. On October 27, 1997, the Asian crisis spread to the New
York Stock Exchange which fell a record 554.26 points, or 7.18 percent of the Dow Jones
industrial average. See Daniel Kadlec, Still on A Roll, TIME, Nov. 10, 1997, at 37-43.
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China to join Hong Kong as members of the WTO. In addition, the CEA's
adoption of a national treatment policy confirms that competition in finan-
cial services is mutually healthy and beneficial.
The financial integration of the CEA is critical to its financial growth
and prosperity at both the regional and international levels. The Mexican
financial crisis in 1994-1995 a1 demonstrated that an unstable financial
system is likely to encumber the development of the economy. In order to
achieve a stable banking system, the CEA needs to maintain stable macro-
economic policies312 and prudent supervision as the core values of its
banking regulations. The Basle Accords provide a reputable and reliable
framework of standards for financial supervision while providing the flexi-
bility of soft law. By adopting and applying the Basle Accords, the CEA
would move significantly closer to establishing a functioning regional fi-
nancial supervisory regime.313
31, The Mexican financial crisis of 1994-95 dealt a serious blow to the Mexican economy.
The ensuing ripple effect, also called the "Tequila Effect," upset other developing and
emerging markets. The same phenomenon explains in part the most recent turbulence in the
international capital markets. Clearly, one of the major actors in the Mexican crisis, the port-
folio or institutional investor, continues to wield tremendous power over economic policy in
developing countries. See Mexican Banks, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 1999, at 11.312 See Highlighting the Link between Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy, IMF
SURVEY, May 20, 1996, at 165-69 (highlighting the influence of macroeconomic and struc-
tured policies on the soundness of the banking system).
313 See GAO, International Banking, Strengthening the Framework for Supervision Inter-
national Banks 4 (1994) (emphasizing that cross-border banking activities need greater ad-
herence to the Basle Accords by countries who adopt and implement the Basle Accords).
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